Basra returning to normal after Sadr truce 31 Mar 2008 11:04:22 GMT
Source: Reuters
* Basra residents bury their dead
* Basra quiet after Sadr ordered followers off streets
* Clashes in Baghdad, Green Zone hit by mortars
(Updates throughout with analyst, colour, death toll)
By Aref Mohammed
BASRA, Iraq, March 31 (Reuters) - Residents buried their dead and swept rubble from the streets after quiet returned to the southern Iraqi city of Basra on Monday, but clashes continued in Baghdad despite a truce to end a week of violence.
Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr called his fighters off the streets on Sunday, nearly a week after a crackdown on them sparked fighting that spread through the south and the capital.
Life slowly returned to normal in Basra where Sadr's masked Mehdi Army militia fighters were no longer to be seen openly brandishing weapons in the street as they had for days.
"We have control of the towns around Basra and also inside the city. There are no clashes anywhere in Basra. Now we are dismantling roadside bombs," said Major-General Mohammed Jawan Huweidi, commander of the Iraqi Army's 14th division.
Shops were beginning to reopen, some for the first time in a week. Authorities said schools would reopen on Tuesday. Residents hosed down the hulks of burnt-out cars. Others drove with coffins in their trunks carrying the unburied dead.
Many expressed anger at the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki for unleashing the violence.
"Today the situation is good. The battle is over. But Maliki did not achieve what he wanted. He ruined Basra," said grocer Numan Taha, 40, reopening his shop in the Hayaniya neighbourhood, a Sadr stronghold.
In Baghdad, where a three-day curfew was mostly lifted, the truce seemed tenuous at best. Explosions struck the "Green Zone" government and diplomatic compound in what police said was a volley of six mortar bombs. Sirens wailed and a recorded voice ordered people to take cover.
U.S. military spokesman Major Mark Cheadle said there were clashes in several Baghdad neighbourhoods early on Monday.
U.S. forces called in at least three helicopter strikes in Baghdad late on Sunday after Sadr's ceasefire, including one in which they said they killed 25 fighters who attacked a convoy struck by a roadside bomb. U.S. helicopter strikes, once rare in the capital, became common over the past week.
"The attacks haven't stopped. There's still a lot of enemy out there, we're not going to quit protecting the populace," Cheadle said. But he said fighting in the capital had eased over the past two days and U.S. forces expected it to ease further.
"They were looking for an excuse to stop fighting," he said. "They don't like facing us because they get killed."
Sadr City, a sprawling slum of about 2 million people that is Sadr's main stronghold and which has witnessed some of the worst fighting in the past week, remained sealed off by U.S. and Iraqi troops, but appeared quiet, said resident Mohammed Hashin.
"The last days were a tragedy: no water no food, garbage heaped in the narrow streets."
Reuters correspondents said southern towns that have seen fighting such as Kut, Hilla and Nassiriya appeared quieter.
A Reuters photographer in Mahumidya, south of Baghdad, said dead bodies were being kept on blocks of ice in a Shi'ite mosque because it was not yet safe enough to bury them.
NEGOTIATIONS
The week saw government troops have little military success driving fighters from the streets in their biggest test yet.
Sadr announced the surprise ceasefire after talks behind the scenes with parties in Maliki's government. As part of the deal, Sadr's aides say, authorities are to end roundups of his followers and implement an amnesty to free prisoners.
The government still says it wants militants to hand over heavy and medium weapons. But Sadr's aides say his followers have no heavy weapons and will keep their light arms to defend themselves against the U.S. "occupation".
"I dont think any party can claim victory," said Mustafa Alani, analyst at the Dubai-based Gulf Research Centre. "Sadr asked his followers to move away from the streets but he is not asking them to disarm. It came out of an agreement, not defeat."
Maliki launched the crackdown last Tuesday in Basra, which controls Iraq's only sea port and 80 percent of its oil revenues. The government has long worried about rival militia fighting for control of Basra and portrayed the crackdown as an attempt to assert state authority in a lawless city.
But the militia are also tied to political parties, and Sadr's followers saw the crackdown as an attempt to subdue them ahead of provincial elections due by October.
Alani said there could be more clashes ahead: "It will be a short honeymoon especially with election time coming up.... Things will escalate before they decline."
The Interior Ministry said 210 people had been killed and 600 wounded in Basra during the week. In Sadr City, 109 dead bodies and 634 wounded were brought to just two hospitals, said Ali Bustan, head of the health directorate for eastern Baghdad.
Scores more were killed in other parts of the capital and in other southern towns.
Jabbar Sabhan, a civil servant in Basra, said he was glad the violence had died down but was doubtful the calm would hold.
"I didn't go to work today. It is true that there are no clashes, gunmen or explosions, but the situation is still dangerous. I don't trust the words of politicians." (Additional reporting by Peter Graff, Aseel Kami, Aws Qusay and Randy Fabi in Baghdad; Writing by Peter Graff; Editing by Samia Nakhoul)
Monday, March 31, 2008
Sunday, March 30, 2008
Ancient Iraqi Cuneiform Found on Ebay
BAGHDAD, IRAQ - APRIL 29: Tablets and other stolen antiquities that were returned in recent days to the Iraqi National Museum are displayed at the museum April 29, 2003 in Baghdad
BAGHDAD, IRAQ - APRIL 29: Tablets and other stolen antiquities that were returned in recent days to the Iraqi National Museum are displayed at the museum April 29, 2003 in Baghdad, Iraq.
Zurich-Based Seller Under Investigation for Smuggling Antiquity Out of Iraq
UNESCO advisories regarding the valuables looted from Baghdad's National Museum have done much to stem the buying and selling of...
Muqtada Al-Sadr, Supports Armed Attacks against US Forces in Iraq and States that the Al-Mahdi Army Will Be "An Interested Party" If Any Arab or Islam
Iraqi Leader of the Al-Mahdi Movement, Muqtada Al-Sadr, Supports Armed Attacks against US Forces in Iraq and States that the Al-Mahdi Army Will Be "An Interested Party" If Any Arab or Islamic Country Is Attacked
Following are excerpts from an interview with Muqtada Al-Sadr, Leader of the Al-Mahdi Army in Iraq, which aired on Al-Jazeera TV on March 29, 2008.
Muqtada Al-Sadr: It's a little difficult to combine studying with the direct leadership of society. I can only move forward in one of these two directions. I have dedicated five years to society, and now I want to dedicate a few years to my studies, so I can be of more benefit to society. I am not secluding myself from society. I am fulfilling my duties to the best of my ability. As has been said in the communiqué, there is a committee that runs things, and I supervise it directly. However, at this point in time, I want to progress in my knowledge and faith.
[...]
It is the duty of the Al-Sadr movement and the Iraqi people to strive to gradually liberate Iraq. The liberation of Iraq does not mean only bearing arms. There is also cultural liberation, social liberation, military liberation, and so on. The assault against Islam is not only military. It is both cultural and military, and it requires, at any given period, diversification of the resistance. But the liberation of Iraq remains a national duty, and a primary goal of the Al-Sadr movement.
[...]
It is true that Saddam was occupying Iraq with his dictatorship and his reckless policies, which were hundreds of miles removed from reason – policies that were, in fact, devoid of any reason. However, the military intervention of the occupying forces of all nationalities does not constitute liberation. The proof is that we did not get rid of Saddam or the Ba'thists. They are still around and still have a negative influence in Iraq. The second this is that the American influence on the Iraqis is even more negative than that of the former Ba'th Party. The Iraqi people still suffers as it did in the days of the Saddam – there are no services, there is a lack of security, and we still suffer from all the things we suffered from in the past. Therefore, this was occupation, not liberation. I call it occupation. I have said in recent years: Gone is the "little Satan," and in came the "Great Satan."
Interviewer: After five years of war, do you still believe that Iraq is occupied?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: Bush used to say that his picture would hang in all the Iraqi homes. No, sir. His picture is now trampled underfoot by the Iraqis.
Interviewer: But is Iraq still occupied by the American forces?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: Yes, it is, and American popularity is dropping daily – why daily? It is dropping by the minute.
[...]
Interviewer: Do you consider acts of resistance to be legitimate when directed against these forces, which you call "occupying forces"?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: No one can deny [the right] to conduct resistance. No human mind would deny it. Resistance is the legitimate right of all peoples. Resistance automatically appears wherever there is occupation. Allah willing, the U.S. will be vanquished, just like it was in Vietnam.
Interviewer: Do you support any armed resistance against these forces, which you label "occupiers"?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: This is the reasonable right...
Interviewer: Do you support it? Do you support armed resistance against the forces you call "occupiers"?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: Against the occupiers – yes, but not against others.
Interviewer: Since you claim that Iraq is now occupied, and that the occupiers are the Americans, do you support conducting acts of armed resistance, in order to liberate Iraq from the occupying American forces, as you call them?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: On condition that these acts do not harm the Iraqi people.
Interviewer: I will get to that. We will talk later about your general political position. Do you openly support these acts?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: Yes, I do.
Interviewer: What do you mean when you say "on condition that they do not harm the Iraqi people"?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: For example, that the battles should not be waged within the city. This is just one example of how to avoid harming the Iraqi people. The targets should be hit accurately, so that others will not be harmed. The people who conduct resistance know these things better than me.
[...]
Interviewer: What we abroad understood was that you disbanded the Al-Mahdi Army, because you had lost control over it.
Muqtada Al-Sadr: The Al-Mahdi Army is under control, or at least most of it. They are obedient, loyal, and faithful. They are even capable of gradually liberating Iraq, Allah willing, along with some other resistance forces.
[...]
This will be the army of the Reformer [the Mahdi], Allah willing. At the end of time, the Mahdi will appear, and if by that time, we are still around, and if we are capable mentally, physically, militarily, and in terms of faith, we will all be his soldiers, Allah willing. Hence, the Al-Mahdi Army is a matter of faith, and it cannot be disbanded.
[...]
Interviewer: What is the strategic goal of the Al-Mahdi Army?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: At present, it is to liberate Iraq, and to defend the Iraqi people in times of crisis, and at the moment Iraq is in a crisis – it is occupied – and should be liberated.
Interviewer: So you state clearly that the goal of the Al-Mahdi Army is...
Muqtada Al-Sadr: To defend Iraq. I never have and never will deny this.
Interviewer: So you continue with this?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: Of course, and if I’m not around – if I am killed, if I die, retire, or whatever – the goal of the Al-Mahdi Army will remain the liberation of Iraq.
Interviewer: Let me say that this comment might sound peculiar to many...
Muqtada Al-Sadr: It will sound peculiar only to the Americans.
Interviewer: The general belief abroad is that you are retiring...
Muqtada Al-Sadr: These are merely tactics... Allah willing, these tactics will not weaken our resolve to liberate Iraq.
[...]
There are plans to divide Iraq – to divide what has already been divided, if I may say so. The Al-Sadr movement must oppose this, and strive to maintain the unity of the Iraqi land and people under any circumstances. Another important goal is to make society religious, rather than secular. People keep talking about an “Islamic government” and so on. What is more important is to make society, not just the government, Islamic. An Islamic government without an Islamic society cannot...
Interviewer: You mentioned your opposition to the division of Iraq. What exactly did you mean? Did you mean the partitioning of Iraq into independent countries, or do you consider federalism and decentralization to be part of this division? People talk about a district in the south, another in the north, the center, the west... What do you mean?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: If federalism does not entail the division of Iraq, it is fine. The important thing is that the occupation is an obstacle to federalism. There can be no federalism as long as there is occupation. As long as there is occupation in Iraq, federalism will constitute the partitioning of the country, even if it is centralized.
Interviewer: You say this unequivocally?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: Yes. If there was no occupation, my answer would be different. Then there would be room for discussion.
[...]
Interviewer: Do you fear there will be more sectarian violence in Iraq in the near future? I am not talking about the resistance, but about internal violence.
Muqtada Al-Sadr: Sectarian violence? It’s possible, because the Americans are in Iraq, and they are constantly touching on this sensitive spot – Shiites against Sunnis, Kurds against Arabs... They are always... I have seen this on TV or somewhere... The Americans are responsible even for the car bombs.
[...]
The Al-Sadr movement is Islamic even more than it is Iraqi. An attack against any Islamic country or people will mean that the Al-Sadr movement will become an interested party.
Interviewer: In what way?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: It will defend Islam however necessary. It will do whatever it can at the time. If any Islamic or Arab country is attacked, the Al-Sadr movement will be an interested party.
[...]
Obviously, I am close to the Shiites ideologically, but politically, I am close to the Sunnis and the decisions they make. Many of the decisions of the Al-Sadr movement correspond to those of the Sunnis.
[...]
Interviewer: How do you view Iran’s role in Iraq, and what are your relations with the Iranian leadership?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: First of all, I don’t do anything in secret. It is all out in the open. I try to maintain good relations with everybody. With regard to the Iranians and the Iranian Republic... In a previous meeting with Khamenei, during a pilgrimage, I told him that we share the same ideology, but that politically and militarily, I would not be an extension of Iran, and that there were negative things that Iran was doing in Iraq. I mentioned to him a few things that Iran needs to rectify with regard to Iraq. Iran committed mistakes that it should not have made.
Following are excerpts from an interview with Muqtada Al-Sadr, Leader of the Al-Mahdi Army in Iraq, which aired on Al-Jazeera TV on March 29, 2008.
Muqtada Al-Sadr: It's a little difficult to combine studying with the direct leadership of society. I can only move forward in one of these two directions. I have dedicated five years to society, and now I want to dedicate a few years to my studies, so I can be of more benefit to society. I am not secluding myself from society. I am fulfilling my duties to the best of my ability. As has been said in the communiqué, there is a committee that runs things, and I supervise it directly. However, at this point in time, I want to progress in my knowledge and faith.
[...]
It is the duty of the Al-Sadr movement and the Iraqi people to strive to gradually liberate Iraq. The liberation of Iraq does not mean only bearing arms. There is also cultural liberation, social liberation, military liberation, and so on. The assault against Islam is not only military. It is both cultural and military, and it requires, at any given period, diversification of the resistance. But the liberation of Iraq remains a national duty, and a primary goal of the Al-Sadr movement.
[...]
It is true that Saddam was occupying Iraq with his dictatorship and his reckless policies, which were hundreds of miles removed from reason – policies that were, in fact, devoid of any reason. However, the military intervention of the occupying forces of all nationalities does not constitute liberation. The proof is that we did not get rid of Saddam or the Ba'thists. They are still around and still have a negative influence in Iraq. The second this is that the American influence on the Iraqis is even more negative than that of the former Ba'th Party. The Iraqi people still suffers as it did in the days of the Saddam – there are no services, there is a lack of security, and we still suffer from all the things we suffered from in the past. Therefore, this was occupation, not liberation. I call it occupation. I have said in recent years: Gone is the "little Satan," and in came the "Great Satan."
Interviewer: After five years of war, do you still believe that Iraq is occupied?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: Bush used to say that his picture would hang in all the Iraqi homes. No, sir. His picture is now trampled underfoot by the Iraqis.
Interviewer: But is Iraq still occupied by the American forces?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: Yes, it is, and American popularity is dropping daily – why daily? It is dropping by the minute.
[...]
Interviewer: Do you consider acts of resistance to be legitimate when directed against these forces, which you call "occupying forces"?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: No one can deny [the right] to conduct resistance. No human mind would deny it. Resistance is the legitimate right of all peoples. Resistance automatically appears wherever there is occupation. Allah willing, the U.S. will be vanquished, just like it was in Vietnam.
Interviewer: Do you support any armed resistance against these forces, which you label "occupiers"?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: This is the reasonable right...
Interviewer: Do you support it? Do you support armed resistance against the forces you call "occupiers"?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: Against the occupiers – yes, but not against others.
Interviewer: Since you claim that Iraq is now occupied, and that the occupiers are the Americans, do you support conducting acts of armed resistance, in order to liberate Iraq from the occupying American forces, as you call them?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: On condition that these acts do not harm the Iraqi people.
Interviewer: I will get to that. We will talk later about your general political position. Do you openly support these acts?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: Yes, I do.
Interviewer: What do you mean when you say "on condition that they do not harm the Iraqi people"?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: For example, that the battles should not be waged within the city. This is just one example of how to avoid harming the Iraqi people. The targets should be hit accurately, so that others will not be harmed. The people who conduct resistance know these things better than me.
[...]
Interviewer: What we abroad understood was that you disbanded the Al-Mahdi Army, because you had lost control over it.
Muqtada Al-Sadr: The Al-Mahdi Army is under control, or at least most of it. They are obedient, loyal, and faithful. They are even capable of gradually liberating Iraq, Allah willing, along with some other resistance forces.
[...]
This will be the army of the Reformer [the Mahdi], Allah willing. At the end of time, the Mahdi will appear, and if by that time, we are still around, and if we are capable mentally, physically, militarily, and in terms of faith, we will all be his soldiers, Allah willing. Hence, the Al-Mahdi Army is a matter of faith, and it cannot be disbanded.
[...]
Interviewer: What is the strategic goal of the Al-Mahdi Army?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: At present, it is to liberate Iraq, and to defend the Iraqi people in times of crisis, and at the moment Iraq is in a crisis – it is occupied – and should be liberated.
Interviewer: So you state clearly that the goal of the Al-Mahdi Army is...
Muqtada Al-Sadr: To defend Iraq. I never have and never will deny this.
Interviewer: So you continue with this?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: Of course, and if I’m not around – if I am killed, if I die, retire, or whatever – the goal of the Al-Mahdi Army will remain the liberation of Iraq.
Interviewer: Let me say that this comment might sound peculiar to many...
Muqtada Al-Sadr: It will sound peculiar only to the Americans.
Interviewer: The general belief abroad is that you are retiring...
Muqtada Al-Sadr: These are merely tactics... Allah willing, these tactics will not weaken our resolve to liberate Iraq.
[...]
There are plans to divide Iraq – to divide what has already been divided, if I may say so. The Al-Sadr movement must oppose this, and strive to maintain the unity of the Iraqi land and people under any circumstances. Another important goal is to make society religious, rather than secular. People keep talking about an “Islamic government” and so on. What is more important is to make society, not just the government, Islamic. An Islamic government without an Islamic society cannot...
Interviewer: You mentioned your opposition to the division of Iraq. What exactly did you mean? Did you mean the partitioning of Iraq into independent countries, or do you consider federalism and decentralization to be part of this division? People talk about a district in the south, another in the north, the center, the west... What do you mean?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: If federalism does not entail the division of Iraq, it is fine. The important thing is that the occupation is an obstacle to federalism. There can be no federalism as long as there is occupation. As long as there is occupation in Iraq, federalism will constitute the partitioning of the country, even if it is centralized.
Interviewer: You say this unequivocally?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: Yes. If there was no occupation, my answer would be different. Then there would be room for discussion.
[...]
Interviewer: Do you fear there will be more sectarian violence in Iraq in the near future? I am not talking about the resistance, but about internal violence.
Muqtada Al-Sadr: Sectarian violence? It’s possible, because the Americans are in Iraq, and they are constantly touching on this sensitive spot – Shiites against Sunnis, Kurds against Arabs... They are always... I have seen this on TV or somewhere... The Americans are responsible even for the car bombs.
[...]
The Al-Sadr movement is Islamic even more than it is Iraqi. An attack against any Islamic country or people will mean that the Al-Sadr movement will become an interested party.
Interviewer: In what way?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: It will defend Islam however necessary. It will do whatever it can at the time. If any Islamic or Arab country is attacked, the Al-Sadr movement will be an interested party.
[...]
Obviously, I am close to the Shiites ideologically, but politically, I am close to the Sunnis and the decisions they make. Many of the decisions of the Al-Sadr movement correspond to those of the Sunnis.
[...]
Interviewer: How do you view Iran’s role in Iraq, and what are your relations with the Iranian leadership?
Muqtada Al-Sadr: First of all, I don’t do anything in secret. It is all out in the open. I try to maintain good relations with everybody. With regard to the Iranians and the Iranian Republic... In a previous meeting with Khamenei, during a pilgrimage, I told him that we share the same ideology, but that politically and militarily, I would not be an extension of Iran, and that there were negative things that Iran was doing in Iraq. I mentioned to him a few things that Iran needs to rectify with regard to Iraq. Iran committed mistakes that it should not have made.
Iraq's Sadr orders followers off streets
Iraq's Sadr orders followers off streets 30 Mar 2008 13:54:29 GMT
Source: Reuters
* Sadr orders his followers off the streets
* Iraqi government welcomes Sadr's announcement
* Sadr aide says fighters will not hand over weapons
(Updates with Sadr aide)
By Khaled Farhan
NAJAF, Iraq March 30 (Reuters) - Iraqi Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr called on his followers on Sunday to stop battling government forces after a week of fighting in Iraq's south and the capital threatened to spiral out of control.
The government immediately welcomed Sadr's statement, saying it would help the authorities impose security in Iraq.
A government crackdown on Sadr's followers in the southern oil port of Basra has sparked an explosion of violence that risks undoing recent improvements in Iraq's fragile security and jeopardising U.S. plans to withdraw troops.
"Because of the religious responsibility, and to stop Iraqi blood being shed ... we call for an end to armed appearances in Basra and all other provinces," Sadr said in a statement given to journalists by his aides in the holy Shi'ite city of Najaf.
"Anyone carrying a weapon and targeting government institutions will not be one of us," the statement said.
Sadr also called on the government to stop "random illegal arrests" of his followers and to implement an amnesty law passed by Iraq's parliament in February to free prisoners.
Sadr's Mehdi Army militia have complained that Iraqi and U.S. forces have exploited a truce called by the cleric last August to make indiscriminate arrests. The U.S. military says it only targets those who have disobeyed Sadr's ceasefire.
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has ordered Shi'ite fighters in Basra to lay down their arms and has extended a 72-hour deadline until April 8 for them to turn over heavy and medium weapons in return for cash.
But a top aide to Sadr, Hazem al-Araji, said Mehdi Army fighters would not hand over their guns. He also said that Sadr's followers had received a guarantee from the government that it would end "random arrests" of Sadr followers.
"As the government of Iraq we welcome this statement," Maliki's spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, said in response to Sadr's comments. "We believe this will support the government of Iraq's efforts to impose security."
Maliki launched the military operation last Tuesday, vowing to reassert his government's control over Iraq's second city, which is dominated by various militias. So far only strongholds of Sadr's followers have been targeted.
The operation has sparked a furious backlash from Sadr's Mehdi Army, who believe Maliki and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, his most powerful Shi'ite ally, are trying to crush them ahead of provincial elections due in October.
(Additional reporting by Waleed Ibrahim in Baghdad; Writing by Ross Colvin and Peter Graff; Editing by Samia Nakhoul)
Iraq says military operation to continue 30 Mar 2008 14:11:49 GMT Source: Reuters
BAGHDAD, March 30 (Reuters) - Iraqi troops will continue their six-day-old military operation in Basra despite a call by Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr for his followers to stop fighting, government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said on Sunday.
"The operation in Basra will continue and will not stop until it achieves its goals. It is not targeting the Sadrists but criminals," Dabbagh told Reuters.
(Reporting by Wisam Mohammed; writing by Peter Graff; Editing by Ibon Villelabeitia)
-------------Al-Sadr's nine-point statement was issued by his headquarters in the holy city of Najaf and broadcast through loudspeakers on Shiite mosques. It said the first point was: "taking gunmen off the streets in Basra and elsewhere."
He also demanded that the Iraqi government stop "haphazard raids" and release security detainees who haven't been charged, two issues cited by his movement as reasons for fighting the government.
Followers handed out sweets in Baghdad's main Mahdi Army militia stronghold of Sadr City.
Scattered firing could be heard in central Baghdad hours after al-Sadr's statement was released, and rockets or mortars were fired toward the U.S.-protected Green Zone.
At least seven Iraqis were killed and 21 wounded when two rounds apparently fell short, striking houses in the commercial district of Karradah, police said.
A U.S. public address system in the Green Zone warned people to "duck and cover" and to stay away from windows.
One of al-Maliki's top security officials was killed in a mortar attack against the palace that houses the military operations center, officials said.
The prime minister's Dawa party issued a statement of condolences identifying the slain official as Salim Qassim, known by his nickname Abu Laith al-Kadhimi.
The strength of the resistance to the week-old offensive has taken the U.S.-backed government by surprise, forcing it to come up with a new tactical plan targeting several Mahdi Army strongholds, a government official said.
The official, who was in Basra but spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to release the information, said Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also had brought in reinforcements and appealed to local tribal leaders to help secure the area.
The prime minister, himself a Shiite, has called the fight "a decisive and final battle" and vowed to remain in Basra until government forces wrest control from militias, including the Mahdi Army that is loyal to radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
But al-Maliki also acknowledged Saturday that he may have miscalculated by failing to foresee the strong backlash the offensive would provoke in Baghdad and other cities where Shiite militias wield power.
---------------
BAGHDAD — Iranian officials helped broker a cease-fire agreement Sunday between Iraq's government and radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, according to Iraqi lawmakers.
The deal could help defuse a wave of violence that had threatened recent security progress in Iraq. It also may signal the growing regional influence of Iran, a country the Bush administration accuses of providing support to terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere.
Al-Sadr ordered his forces off the streets of Iraq on Sunday. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki hailed al-Sadr's action as "a step in the right direction." It was unclear whether the deal would completely end six days of clashes between U.S.-backed Iraqi forces and Shiite militias, including al-Sadr's.
Osama al-Nujaifi, a Sunni lawmaker who oversaw mediation in Baghdad, said representatives from al-Maliki's Dawa Party and another Shiite party traveled to Iran to finalize talks with al-Sadr.
Haidar al-Abadi, a Dawa legislator who is close to al-Maliki, confirmed that Iranians played a role in the negotiations. Sadiq al-Rikabi, a senior adviser to al-Maliki, said he could not confirm or deny Iranian involvement in the deal.
"The government proved once again that Iran is a central player in Iraq," said Iraqi political analyst and former intelligence officer Ibrahim Sumydai.
"Everything we heard indicates the Sadrists had control of more ground in Basra at the end of the fighting than they did at the beginning," said al-Nujaifi, the Sunni mediator. "The government realized things were not going in the right direction."
Curfews and clashes cripple Baghdad, Basra
IRAQ: 30 Mar 2008 10:30:03 GMT
Source: IRIN
BAGHDAD, 30 March 2008 (IRIN) - Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) appealed to the Iraqi authorities on 30 March to facilitate their distribution of relief materials in Baghdad and Basra, 545km southeast of the capital. Both cities are under an indefinite curfew due to ongoing clashes between government forces and the Mahdi Army, the Shia militia led by Moqtada al-Sadr.
"We call upon the [Iraqi] government to allow local and international aid organisations to move during curfew time and get into conflict areas to do their job," Basil al-Azawi, head of the Iraqi Commission for Civil Society Enterprises (ICCSE), a coalition of over 1,000 Iraqi NGOs, told IRIN.
"It is a really dangerous situation and must be focused on. The clashes and curfew have highly affected the delivery of humanitarian assistance in both Baghdad and Basra. People are still in dire need of food and water and some hospitals need medicines and medical items," he said.
Al-Azawi added that Iraqi security forces prevented him on 28 March from entering Baghdad's eastern district of Sadr city, where clashes were taking place, as he was heading a team to determine the needs of residents.
Since 28 March, Baghdad has been under a round-the-clock curfew which was due to expire on 30 March but has now been extended indefinitely.
"The government must find ways to confront militants without violating civilians' human rights. These military operations have added more to Iraqis' daily suffering with shortages of drinking water, food and medicines," Al-Azawi said.
Basra conditions deteriorating
In Basra, where clashes beginning on 25 March triggered violence in the capital, local officials said an escalation of fighting and an ongoing curfew had further deteriorated the living conditions of the some 1.7 million residents there.
"Supermarkets have run out of all tinned food, dried food and bottled water while hospitals, especially those in areas where the clashes are intense - like al-Menaa, al-Shafaa and al-Ashaar - are in dire need of blood, medicines and other medical materials," Mahdi al-Tamimi, head of the city's human rights office, told IRIN.
Al-Tamimi said that many of Basra's residents were daily wage earners, who, without jobs to go to now, would have no means of buying anything and were unlikely to have stocks of supplies.
"We urgently call upon the government and UN organisations to provide drinking water, food and medicines in addition to the ambulances they have already provided to help those who need medical care get to the hospitals," he added.
Red Crescent action
Attempting to alleviate the suffering of Basra residents, the Iraqi Red Crescent Society has set up an operation room in the relatively peaceful neighbouring Missan Province to handle the distribution of relief materials to Basra.
"So far we have managed to distribute food parcels - each one containing 17 items, including sugar, rice, flour, tomato paste and milk - to some hospitals and we hope there will be a lull later today to distribute other things," Salih Hmoud, head of the IRCS provincial office in Basra, said.
sm/ar/ed
Source: IRIN
BAGHDAD, 30 March 2008 (IRIN) - Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) appealed to the Iraqi authorities on 30 March to facilitate their distribution of relief materials in Baghdad and Basra, 545km southeast of the capital. Both cities are under an indefinite curfew due to ongoing clashes between government forces and the Mahdi Army, the Shia militia led by Moqtada al-Sadr.
"We call upon the [Iraqi] government to allow local and international aid organisations to move during curfew time and get into conflict areas to do their job," Basil al-Azawi, head of the Iraqi Commission for Civil Society Enterprises (ICCSE), a coalition of over 1,000 Iraqi NGOs, told IRIN.
"It is a really dangerous situation and must be focused on. The clashes and curfew have highly affected the delivery of humanitarian assistance in both Baghdad and Basra. People are still in dire need of food and water and some hospitals need medicines and medical items," he said.
Al-Azawi added that Iraqi security forces prevented him on 28 March from entering Baghdad's eastern district of Sadr city, where clashes were taking place, as he was heading a team to determine the needs of residents.
Since 28 March, Baghdad has been under a round-the-clock curfew which was due to expire on 30 March but has now been extended indefinitely.
"The government must find ways to confront militants without violating civilians' human rights. These military operations have added more to Iraqis' daily suffering with shortages of drinking water, food and medicines," Al-Azawi said.
Basra conditions deteriorating
In Basra, where clashes beginning on 25 March triggered violence in the capital, local officials said an escalation of fighting and an ongoing curfew had further deteriorated the living conditions of the some 1.7 million residents there.
"Supermarkets have run out of all tinned food, dried food and bottled water while hospitals, especially those in areas where the clashes are intense - like al-Menaa, al-Shafaa and al-Ashaar - are in dire need of blood, medicines and other medical materials," Mahdi al-Tamimi, head of the city's human rights office, told IRIN.
Al-Tamimi said that many of Basra's residents were daily wage earners, who, without jobs to go to now, would have no means of buying anything and were unlikely to have stocks of supplies.
"We urgently call upon the government and UN organisations to provide drinking water, food and medicines in addition to the ambulances they have already provided to help those who need medical care get to the hospitals," he added.
Red Crescent action
Attempting to alleviate the suffering of Basra residents, the Iraqi Red Crescent Society has set up an operation room in the relatively peaceful neighbouring Missan Province to handle the distribution of relief materials to Basra.
"So far we have managed to distribute food parcels - each one containing 17 items, including sugar, rice, flour, tomato paste and milk - to some hospitals and we hope there will be a lull later today to distribute other things," Salih Hmoud, head of the IRCS provincial office in Basra, said.
sm/ar/ed
Saturday, March 29, 2008
Events & Pictures: Iraqi security forces handed over their weapons in Sadr City
An Iraqi army armoured vehicle burns outside the al-Iraqiya television network in Basra, 550 km (340 miles) south of Baghdad, March 30, 2008. The al-Iraqiya television building, which was guarded by government soldiers, has been overrun by the fighters from the Mehdi army after clashes in Basra on Sunday, a fighter from the Mehdi army said.
REUTERS/Atef Hassan (IRAQ)
An Iraqi woman reacts as she watches Mahdi Army fighters storm a state al-Iraqiya TV facility in Basra, Iraq, Sunday, March 30, 2008. Mahdi Army fighters stormed a state TV facility in the southern city of Basra on Sunday, forcing Iraqi military guards surrounding the building to flee and setting armored vehicles on fire.
(AP Photo/Nabil al-Jurani)
A woman cries after an airstrike in Basra, Iraq, Saturday, March 29, 2008. A U.S. warplane strafed a house in a southern Iraqi city and killed eight civilians, including two women and one child, Iraqi police said Saturday. The U.S. military had no immediate comment on the report.
(AP Photo/Nabil al-Jurani)
Relatives load the coffins of Mohammed Rijab, a primary school headmaster, and his three children, 22 and 10 year old sons and a 20 year old daughter, who were killed after witnesses said gunmen riding Iraqi Army Humvees broke into their home in Basra, Iraq, Saturday, March 29, 2008.
(AP Photo/Nabil al-Jurani)
Men rest after digging graves for Mehdi fighters who were killed in clashes in Baghdad, in a cemetery in Najaf, 160 km (100 miles) south of Baghdad March 29, 2008. The death toll mounted on Saturday in fighting in Baghdad where U.S. forces have been drawn deeper into an Iraqi government crackdown on militants loyal to Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.
(Ali Abu Shish/Reuters)
The first group of soldiers in the new Iraqi army march at their graduation ceremony at Kir Kush, Iraq, in this Oct. 4, 2003 file photo. The 700 recruits who graduated make up the first of 26 battalions planned over the next year. The recruits, who completed two months of training, will be paid at least $60 per month.
(AP Photo/Greg Baker, File)
Members of the Iraqi security forces hand over their weapons to a member of Moqtada al-Sadr's office in Baghdad's Sadr City March 29, 2008. In Baghdad's Sadr City, Sadr's main stronghold, a group of Iraqi police and soldiers surrendered themselves and their weapons to the local Sadr office, a Reuters photographer said. The spokesman for Iraqi security forces in Baghdad, Major-General Qassim Moussawi, sought to play down the desertions, saying he had received reports of only 15 men surrendering. He said those who did so would be court-martialled.
REUTERS/Kareem Raheem (IRAQ)
---------------
By KIM GAMEL, Associated Press Writer
1 hour, 23 minutes ago
BAGHDAD - A U.S. warplane strafed snipers in the southern city of Basra, killing at least 16 suspected militants after Iraqi troops came under heavy fire, the American military said.
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Iraqi police earlier claimed eight civilians, including two women and a child, had been killed in a predawn airstrike in the Hananiyah neighborhood, a known Shiite militia stronghold.
But Maj. Brad Leighton, a U.S. military spokesman, said U.S. and Iraqi special operations forces had identified snipers on several roofs before the strike was ordered.
An AC-130 gunship then opened fire on enemy positions on three roofs.
"Initial reports indicate 16 criminal fighters were killed," he said in an e-mail response to a query by The Associated Press.
The American support occurred as Iraqi troops struggled against strong resistance from militia fighters in Basra, where Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has vowed to keep up the fight despite mounting anger among followers of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
The government crackdown has prompted retaliation elsewhere in Shiite areas in Baghdad and other cities in the oil-rich south.
American jets were first called to attack militia positions in Basra on Friday, four days after al-Maliki launched the operation to clear the city of militia violence.
The airstrike followed fierce clashes between the Iraqi security forces and Shiite militiamen, Leighton said in the first confirmation of the airstrikes by the U.S. military.
Iraqi ground forces also killed four suspected militants after coming under unrelenting fire by small arms and rocket-propelled grenades during a raid in a known criminal stronghold in western Basra, Leighton said.
Two women and five children were found unharmed in the targeted building, according to the statement. It added that two more extremists were killed after the Iraqi troops came under attack again from surrounding buildings.
During the gunbattle, Iraqi commandos "and a supporting U.S. special forces team identified additional armed criminal elements on several rooftops in the area," and called in the airstrike, Leighton said.
U.S. jets also dropped two precision-guided bombs later Saturday on a suspected militia stronghold at Qarmat Ali north of the city, British military spokesman Maj. Tom Holloway said.
"My understanding was that this was a building that had people who were shooting back at Iraqi ground forces," Holloway said.
Leighton said he had no further information on that airstrike.
Iraq's Sadr tells followers to keep arms -aide
29 Mar 2008 16:58:00 GMT
Source: Reuters
(Updates with background)
NAJAF, Iraq, March 29 (Reuters) - Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has told his followers not to lay down their arms, rejecting a demand by the Iraqi government which launched a crackdown against them this week, a top aide said on Saturday.
"Moqtada al-Sadr asks his followers not to deliver weapons to the government. Weapons should be turned over only to a government which can expel the occupiers," aide Hassan Zargani told Reuters by telephone.
A member of the Sadrist political committee in the holy Shi'ite city of Najaf, Haidar al-Jabari, confirmed the remarks.
(Reporting by Khaled Farhan; writing by Peter Graff; editing by Jon Boyle)
Source: Reuters
(Updates with background)
NAJAF, Iraq, March 29 (Reuters) - Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has told his followers not to lay down their arms, rejecting a demand by the Iraqi government which launched a crackdown against them this week, a top aide said on Saturday.
"Moqtada al-Sadr asks his followers not to deliver weapons to the government. Weapons should be turned over only to a government which can expel the occupiers," aide Hassan Zargani told Reuters by telephone.
A member of the Sadrist political committee in the holy Shi'ite city of Najaf, Haidar al-Jabari, confirmed the remarks.
(Reporting by Khaled Farhan; writing by Peter Graff; editing by Jon Boyle)
US & Coalition forces both dropped bombs over Basra
An AFP photographer said US-led coalition warplanes bombed the Al-Baath neighbourhood of northwest Basra early on Saturday, killing at least eight people. Several more people were feared killed, he added. And entire building full of Jihadis collapsed with all aboard. No one is digging for the survivors.
There were two more strikes later in the day, British Major Tom Holloway
A British defense official in London who also declined to be identified in line with department policy, however, said US fighter jets dropped the bombs while British planes provided air support.
In Baghdad, a US helicopter also fired a Hellfire missile during fighting in the Baghdad's militia stronghold of Sadr City early Friday, killing four gunmen, military spokesman Lt. Col. Steve Stover said.
Ground forces called for the airstrike after coming under small-arms fire while clearing a main supply route at 4:10 a.m., he added.
Iraqi police and hospital officials in Sadr City said five civilians were killed and four others wounded in the attack.
The strikes underscore the risks that the US and its allies in Iraq could be drawn into an internal Shiite conflict that has threatened to unravel al-Sadr's cease-fire and spark a new cycle of violence after months of relative calm.
Rockets or mortars also were lobbed at a US facility in the southern city of Hillah, although no casualties were reported, the military said. The highlite is the goof who fired an RPG at an M1A1.
It sure sounds like the shiites are doing just dandy.
----
By Damien McElroy, Foreign Affairs Correspondent
Last Updated: 1:13am GMT 29/03/2008
The Iraqi government's lack of success in Basra was highlighted when the Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, extended a deadline by 10 days for Shi'ite militia loyal to cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to give up their weapons, and offered them cash to do so.
There was no clear indication from Basra's streets that the involvement of coalition airpower had tilted the balance. Militia fighters had painted slogans and photographs of Sadr on captured vehicles. Humanitarian organisations warned that food, medical and water supplies were running low in areas under government siege.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
Maliki's Basra crackdown poses risk for U.S.
Iraq's Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (2nd L) shakes hands with tribal members in Basra March 29, 2008. Iraqi interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani is seen at left. REUTERS/Iraqi Government Office/Handout
"We used to talk about al Qaeda. Unfortunately it seems there are some among us who are worse than al Qaeda," Maliki said in a televised meeting with tribal leaders in Basra, where he has personally overseen the crackdown since Tuesday.
After years in which Iraq was torn apart by violence between Shi'ites and Sunni Arab militants like al Qaeda, the past week's violence has exposed another bloody rift -- among Shi'ites themselves. Parties in Maliki's government are battling followers of Sadr, who in many Shi'ite areas rule the streets.
A Sadr aide said his representatives had made an overture to the reclusive Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's highest Shi'ite authority, in a bid to end the violence.
----------
In a rare interview taped just before this week's outbreak of violence, Sadr told al-Jazeera television: "I call on the Arab League, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the United Nations to recognise the legitimacy of the resistance." Speaking of the meeting with Sistani, the Sadr aide, Salah al-Ubaidi, said Sistani had called for a peaceful solution.
ANALYSIS- 29 Mar 2008 10:37:25 GMT
Source: Reuters
By Dominic Evans LONDON, March 29 (Reuters) - Iraq's crackdown on the Mehdi Army in Basra poses a dilemma for the United States, which wants Iraqi forces to take a lead on security but risks getting sucked into their violent Shi'ite feud.
Security forces have battled the Mehdi Army militia loyal to Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in Iraq's southern oil city for days, targeting what Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has called "outlaws".
But there is little prospect of a swift victory. The fighting has spread through southern regions, drew the U.S. forces and led to protests in Baghdad by followers of Sadr, who say Maliki is using force to weaken his political rivals.
Sadr pulled out of Maliki's Shi'ite-led government last year when the prime minister refused to set a deadline for U.S. troop withdrawals. But Sadr also ordered his Mehdi Army to observe a ceasefire which has been central to a recent fall in violence.
"The key question now is what the United States is going to do," said Joost Hiltermann, of the International Crisis Group think tank. "If it allows (the crackdown) to go forward the ceasefire will unravel and the U.S. will face the Sadr movement in its full power."
"This will be bad for both sides. Sadr will lose men and the United States will lose the gains of the surge".
The Mehdi Army twice launched uprisings against the U.S. occupation in 2004 and was blamed for sectarian death squad killings at the height of Iraq's vicious civil strife.
President George W. Bush sent reinforcements last year to help bring Iraq back from the brink of all-out civil war, but plans to withdraw 20,000 troops by July, leaving the total close to the 140,000 level it had before the increase.
He has praised the Basra operation as proof that Baghdad is increasingly able to handle security without U.S. leadership.
But U.S. forces were drawn deeper into the fighting on Friday when they launched air strikes in support of Iraqi units on the ground in Basra.
Hiltermann said although the United States was "desperate to show progress by Iraqis", the Basra operation was unlikely to yield results.
"I doubt very much the Iraqi forces in Basra can stand on their own two feet. They are not a national army."
POLITICAL AGENDA?
Analysts say Maliki's decision to launch the Basra crackdown, instead of carrying through with a promised offensive against Sunni Islamist militants in the northern city of Mosul, lends weight to the Sadrist accusations of a political agenda.
The attacks have targeted the Mehdi Army while leaving two other powers in Basra, the Fadhila party and the militant Badr Organisation of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) -- which supports Maliki's Dawa Party -- largely untouched.
"If Maliki had been serious about ending militia rule in Basra he should also have dealt with the militias of Fadhila and the Badr brigades," said Reidar Visser, an expert on southern Iraq who edits the Web site www.historiae.org.
Iraq's Shi'ite Muslim power struggles have been heightened by political rivalry ahead of provincial elections in October.
The showdown in Basra involved competition for control of oil resources, rivalries ahead of the October elections and disagreement over whether Basra should become part of a Shi'ite federal region in southern Iraq, Visser said.
He said the United States had consistently supported Maliki in confronting other Shi'ite factions, and ran the risk of getting deeply embroiled in the latest conflict.
Fighting has broken out across Shi'ite southern Iraq. Mehdi Army fighters seized control of the city of Nassiriya and have also held territory or fought with authorities in Kut, Hilla, Amara, Kerbala, Diwaniya and other towns over the past days.
"(The United States) should carefully think through the dangers of uncritically accepting Maliki's definition of who is an unlawful militiaman and who is not," Visser said.
Vali Nasr, a Middle East expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, said the fighting pitted Sadr's Mehdi Army against the SIIC's Badr Organisation fighters -- many of whom have joined the regular Iraqi security forces.
"Maliki is not in control of Shi'ite politics in the south, and that is the real prize right now that Sadr and (SIIC leader Abdul-Aziz) Hakim are fighting for," Nasr said.
Despite the violence, Sadr has not formally abandoned the ceasefire he announced in August. Hiltermann said Sadr still wanted to avoid direct confrontation with U.S. forces, unless he felt there was no alternative.
"I don't think they will change that unless they see the U.S. openly confronting them instead of Iraqi proxies," he said.
If the ceasefire were to collapse entirely, U.S. talk of greater stability in Iraq created by the recent troop reinforcements will have proved to be hollow, Nasr said.
"It will make the outcome of the surge look completely different from the way in which it has been interpreted in the United States right now as an unmitigated success in bringing stability to Iraq, reducing the number of casualties for the Americans, and the number of deaths for Iraqis.
(Editing by Samia Nakhoul)
Friday, March 28, 2008
19 Tense Hours in Sadr City Alongside the Mahdi Army
BAGHDAD, March 28 -- The gunfire struck like thunderclaps, building to a steady rhythm. American soldiers in a Stryker armored vehicle fired away from one end of the block. At the other end, two groups of Shiite militiamen pounded back with heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. American helicopters circled above in the blue afternoon sky.
As a heavy barrage erupted outside his parents' house, Abu Mustafa al-Thahabi, a political and military adviser to the Mahdi Army of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, rushed through the purple gate and took shelter behind the thick walls. He had just spoken with a fighter by cellphone. "I told him not to use that weapon. It's not effective," he said, referring to a rocket-propelled grenade. "I told him to use the IED, the Iranian one," he added, using the shorthand for an improvised explosive device. "This is more effective."
After nearly a year of relative calm, U.S. troops and Shiite militiamen engaged in pitched battles this week, underscoring how quickly order can give way to chaos in Iraq. On this block in Sadr City, the cleric's sprawling stronghold, men and boys came out from nearly every house to fight, using powerful IEDs and rockets.
From Thursday afternoon to Friday morning, this correspondent spent 19 hours on the block, including hours trapped by intense crossfire inside the house of Thahabi's parents.
During this time, the fighters engaged U.S. forces for seven hours. They lost a comrade. They launched rockets into the Green Zone. At approximately the same time, rockets killed a U.S. government employee, the second American killed there this week.
In between battles, fighters spoke about politics and war. There was no sign of dread, or grief, or fear. Death was a matter of honor, a shortcut to some divine place.
As the two sides exchanged fire, Thahabi's mother, Um Falah, clutched a Koran and began to recite a prayer to Imam Ali, Shiite Islam's most revered saint. Her eldest son, Abu Hassan, a Mahdi Army commander, was fighting this day.
"May Ali be with you," said Um Falah, who wore a black abaya and round eyeglasses. "I pray that all the bullets will not affect you."
Shiite Against Shiite
Earlier that morning, Sadr City had been eerily quiet. Cars moved slowly. Residents carried food and water, preparing for the worst. Piles of trash littered the streets, which was charred in patches from burning tires. On one road, two olive-green Stryker vehicles were parked. Other roads were lined with roadside bombs, fighters reported.
Outside Um Falah's house, Mahdi Army fighters gathered at both ends of the block. They stood against the walls, peering down the street. Clashes were unfolding on an adjacent road. One group joined the fighting, but the others remained in place. Their job was to protect their end of the block.
Um Falah stood in the courtyard, her face lined with anxiety. But she continued her chores calmly. "I have gotten used to war, to all the battles in our lives," she said. It was not the first time her son had gone to battle U.S. troops, and in her heart, she said, she knew it would not be the last. "I have sent my son on the right path," she said.
In their living room, her husband and Abu Mustafa sat on red carpets set with colorful pillows. The room was prepared for battle, with plastic windowpanes and drawn curtains. On the wall hung tapestries depicting Imam Ali and other Shiite saints.
-----------
Thahabi, slim and gaunt-faced, said that this time the Mahdi Army was not fighting only the Americans. The militiamen were also fighting their Shiite rivals -- the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Dawa party, which run Iraq's government.
Thahabi said he believes the government launched an offensive in the southern port city of Basra last Monday to weaken the Sadrist forces ahead of provincial elections scheduled for this year. He added that he thought Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who leads the Dawa party, was taking advantage of a cease-fire imposed by Sadr last August.
Iraq's government said it began the offensive to wipe out Shiite militias and criminal gangs in Basra. In recent days, however, the fighting has spread to other parts of Iraq.
"They know the Sadrists will win the elections," Thahabi said of the government. "So they are using the Americans against the Mahdi Army. People have reached a point that they will sell their refrigerator to buy a rocket launcher to shoot and kill the Americans."
'If We Die, We Win'
Three solemn-faced Mahdi Army fighters entered the living room at around 2 p.m., fresh from battle. "Akeel, son of Riad, just got killed," said Abu Zainab al-Kabi. The room fell silent.
Kabi, 34, said Akeel had been planting a roadside bomb when he was shot multiple times by an American soldier. Akeel was 22 and had followed his father and uncle into the Mahdi Army when he was 17. The fighters took his body to the hospital morgue. If they could break away from the battle, they planned to carry Akeel's body on Friday to the southern holy city of Najaf, where the Mahdi Army has built a cemetery for their dead, whom they call martyrs.
"We are proud that he died," said Abu Moussa al-Sadr, 31, another militiaman. "Whenever one of us dies, it raises our morale. It intensifies our fighting."
"If we defeat them, we win," Kabi said. "And if we die, we win."
Any sorrow they felt for Akeel soon appeared to vanish. They wanted to eat lunch. Over a spare meal of bread, tomato paste and vegetables, they said they had woken before dawn to make sure all their fighters were in position. They ordered their men to check all the IEDs they had set and shared intelligence with commanders in other sections of Sadr City.
Suddenly, they heard mortar rounds being launched outside with a boom like the sound of a wrecking ball.
"This is to the Green Zone," said Kabi. "These are gifts to Maliki's government."
He and Abu Moussa al-Sadr both work for Iraq's Ministry of Interior, which runs the police and is widely viewed as infiltrated by the Mahdi Army. They said that many police officers had defected from the government and were now fighting with the Mahdi Army.
-------
The fighters also said they received neither support nor training from Iran, as U.S. military commanders allege. Their Iranian weapons, they said, were bought from smugglers. They said they had been fighting only American soldiers and had not yet engaged with any Iraqi forces inside Sadr City.
They insisted that they were still obeying Sadr's cease-fire and would stop fighting if he gave the order.
"We are allowed to defend ourselves," said Abu Nargis, another fighter.
Around 3 p.m., it was time to leave the house. "We're going to the hospital to see Akeel's body," Abu Moussa al-Sadr said. "Then we are going back to fight."
A Larger Strategy
On the street, shortly after 4 p.m., another group of fighters were battling American troops. Militiamen jumped into the street, then quickly vanished.
The quick movements were a tactic. Thahabi, standing outside his parents' house, explained that one group of fighters would direct a barrage of bullets at the Stryker to distract the soldiers while another group tried to slip a powerful roadside bomb under the vehicle and then detonate it.
A father of four who studied psychology in college, Thahabi wore olive pants and a blue sweater, looking more like a professor than a militia adviser. He spoke in a slow, measured voice and clutched three cellphones, each using a different network. When the Americans drive by, they usually jam the signals of the main cellphone provider, to neutralize use of the phones as bomb detonators.
The fighters' larger strategy, Thahabi said, was to draw pressure away from the Mahdi Army in Basra. He said that many Iraqi soldiers fighting in Basra had families in Sadr City. "They will be worried for their families. They will fear what will happen to them. It's about reducing their morale."
Moments later, Thahabi received a phone call. "The whole block has been surrounded by the Americans," he said, stepping back inside the house.
Firing on the Green Zone
At 5:25 p.m., the Mahdi Army fired at least 10 rockets from near the house, each with a loud swish. Within 20 minutes, four more were launched.
At approximately the same time, U.S. officials said, 12 rockets landed inside the Green Zone, killing the U.S. government employee.
The rocket launches were followed by heavy gunfire directed at the Stryker.
-----------------------
"We have to keep the Americans nervous, on their edge," Thahabi said. "We can't make it easy for them."
Soon, fighters informed him that there was an American sniper on a nearby roof. After a silent pause, fighters sprayed a burst of gunfire at the roof of a house; bullets tore into the wall. Silence again. A few minutes later, more gunfire headed in the direction of the fighters.
The Americans were still around.
"They are facing heavy resistance," said Abu Nargis, who was staying at the house. He carried his baby daughter. "They will raid the area tonight."
But by 7 p.m., the Stryker had left.
Dead and Injured
At 9:05 p.m., Abu Nargis received a phone call. He said he had been told that a police commander with 500 policemen would stop working with the government and join the Mahdi Army.
At 9:09 p.m., screams tore through the street. A woman in a black abaya was walking toward the hospital, wailing: "My mother! My mother!" Her house had been hit, but it was not clear by whom. Seconds later, ambulances and police vehicles drove past the house as an unmanned U.S. drone flew by. The ambulances and police vehicles drove back, carrying dead and injured.
There was more gunfire. At 10:35 p.m., Abu Nargis received another phone call.
"The Americans are gone. Even the snipers," he said.
He headed to his bedroom. "I have to go and check on my daughter," he said. "She's afraid of the gunfire."
The next morning, Kabi was standing on a nearby street with a group of fighters, including two boys who looked no older than 13. They were getting instructions from an older fighter, who clutched an AK-47 assault rifle. They looked weary, as if they had stayed up all night.
At the edge of Sadr City, four Strykers rolled by. A white car waited patiently for the convoy to pass, then drove out. A wooden coffin was strapped to the top.
As a heavy barrage erupted outside his parents' house, Abu Mustafa al-Thahabi, a political and military adviser to the Mahdi Army of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, rushed through the purple gate and took shelter behind the thick walls. He had just spoken with a fighter by cellphone. "I told him not to use that weapon. It's not effective," he said, referring to a rocket-propelled grenade. "I told him to use the IED, the Iranian one," he added, using the shorthand for an improvised explosive device. "This is more effective."
After nearly a year of relative calm, U.S. troops and Shiite militiamen engaged in pitched battles this week, underscoring how quickly order can give way to chaos in Iraq. On this block in Sadr City, the cleric's sprawling stronghold, men and boys came out from nearly every house to fight, using powerful IEDs and rockets.
From Thursday afternoon to Friday morning, this correspondent spent 19 hours on the block, including hours trapped by intense crossfire inside the house of Thahabi's parents.
During this time, the fighters engaged U.S. forces for seven hours. They lost a comrade. They launched rockets into the Green Zone. At approximately the same time, rockets killed a U.S. government employee, the second American killed there this week.
In between battles, fighters spoke about politics and war. There was no sign of dread, or grief, or fear. Death was a matter of honor, a shortcut to some divine place.
As the two sides exchanged fire, Thahabi's mother, Um Falah, clutched a Koran and began to recite a prayer to Imam Ali, Shiite Islam's most revered saint. Her eldest son, Abu Hassan, a Mahdi Army commander, was fighting this day.
"May Ali be with you," said Um Falah, who wore a black abaya and round eyeglasses. "I pray that all the bullets will not affect you."
Shiite Against Shiite
Earlier that morning, Sadr City had been eerily quiet. Cars moved slowly. Residents carried food and water, preparing for the worst. Piles of trash littered the streets, which was charred in patches from burning tires. On one road, two olive-green Stryker vehicles were parked. Other roads were lined with roadside bombs, fighters reported.
Outside Um Falah's house, Mahdi Army fighters gathered at both ends of the block. They stood against the walls, peering down the street. Clashes were unfolding on an adjacent road. One group joined the fighting, but the others remained in place. Their job was to protect their end of the block.
Um Falah stood in the courtyard, her face lined with anxiety. But she continued her chores calmly. "I have gotten used to war, to all the battles in our lives," she said. It was not the first time her son had gone to battle U.S. troops, and in her heart, she said, she knew it would not be the last. "I have sent my son on the right path," she said.
In their living room, her husband and Abu Mustafa sat on red carpets set with colorful pillows. The room was prepared for battle, with plastic windowpanes and drawn curtains. On the wall hung tapestries depicting Imam Ali and other Shiite saints.
-----------
Thahabi, slim and gaunt-faced, said that this time the Mahdi Army was not fighting only the Americans. The militiamen were also fighting their Shiite rivals -- the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Dawa party, which run Iraq's government.
Thahabi said he believes the government launched an offensive in the southern port city of Basra last Monday to weaken the Sadrist forces ahead of provincial elections scheduled for this year. He added that he thought Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who leads the Dawa party, was taking advantage of a cease-fire imposed by Sadr last August.
Iraq's government said it began the offensive to wipe out Shiite militias and criminal gangs in Basra. In recent days, however, the fighting has spread to other parts of Iraq.
"They know the Sadrists will win the elections," Thahabi said of the government. "So they are using the Americans against the Mahdi Army. People have reached a point that they will sell their refrigerator to buy a rocket launcher to shoot and kill the Americans."
'If We Die, We Win'
Three solemn-faced Mahdi Army fighters entered the living room at around 2 p.m., fresh from battle. "Akeel, son of Riad, just got killed," said Abu Zainab al-Kabi. The room fell silent.
Kabi, 34, said Akeel had been planting a roadside bomb when he was shot multiple times by an American soldier. Akeel was 22 and had followed his father and uncle into the Mahdi Army when he was 17. The fighters took his body to the hospital morgue. If they could break away from the battle, they planned to carry Akeel's body on Friday to the southern holy city of Najaf, where the Mahdi Army has built a cemetery for their dead, whom they call martyrs.
"We are proud that he died," said Abu Moussa al-Sadr, 31, another militiaman. "Whenever one of us dies, it raises our morale. It intensifies our fighting."
"If we defeat them, we win," Kabi said. "And if we die, we win."
Any sorrow they felt for Akeel soon appeared to vanish. They wanted to eat lunch. Over a spare meal of bread, tomato paste and vegetables, they said they had woken before dawn to make sure all their fighters were in position. They ordered their men to check all the IEDs they had set and shared intelligence with commanders in other sections of Sadr City.
Suddenly, they heard mortar rounds being launched outside with a boom like the sound of a wrecking ball.
"This is to the Green Zone," said Kabi. "These are gifts to Maliki's government."
He and Abu Moussa al-Sadr both work for Iraq's Ministry of Interior, which runs the police and is widely viewed as infiltrated by the Mahdi Army. They said that many police officers had defected from the government and were now fighting with the Mahdi Army.
-------
The fighters also said they received neither support nor training from Iran, as U.S. military commanders allege. Their Iranian weapons, they said, were bought from smugglers. They said they had been fighting only American soldiers and had not yet engaged with any Iraqi forces inside Sadr City.
They insisted that they were still obeying Sadr's cease-fire and would stop fighting if he gave the order.
"We are allowed to defend ourselves," said Abu Nargis, another fighter.
Around 3 p.m., it was time to leave the house. "We're going to the hospital to see Akeel's body," Abu Moussa al-Sadr said. "Then we are going back to fight."
A Larger Strategy
On the street, shortly after 4 p.m., another group of fighters were battling American troops. Militiamen jumped into the street, then quickly vanished.
The quick movements were a tactic. Thahabi, standing outside his parents' house, explained that one group of fighters would direct a barrage of bullets at the Stryker to distract the soldiers while another group tried to slip a powerful roadside bomb under the vehicle and then detonate it.
A father of four who studied psychology in college, Thahabi wore olive pants and a blue sweater, looking more like a professor than a militia adviser. He spoke in a slow, measured voice and clutched three cellphones, each using a different network. When the Americans drive by, they usually jam the signals of the main cellphone provider, to neutralize use of the phones as bomb detonators.
The fighters' larger strategy, Thahabi said, was to draw pressure away from the Mahdi Army in Basra. He said that many Iraqi soldiers fighting in Basra had families in Sadr City. "They will be worried for their families. They will fear what will happen to them. It's about reducing their morale."
Moments later, Thahabi received a phone call. "The whole block has been surrounded by the Americans," he said, stepping back inside the house.
Firing on the Green Zone
At 5:25 p.m., the Mahdi Army fired at least 10 rockets from near the house, each with a loud swish. Within 20 minutes, four more were launched.
At approximately the same time, U.S. officials said, 12 rockets landed inside the Green Zone, killing the U.S. government employee.
The rocket launches were followed by heavy gunfire directed at the Stryker.
-----------------------
"We have to keep the Americans nervous, on their edge," Thahabi said. "We can't make it easy for them."
Soon, fighters informed him that there was an American sniper on a nearby roof. After a silent pause, fighters sprayed a burst of gunfire at the roof of a house; bullets tore into the wall. Silence again. A few minutes later, more gunfire headed in the direction of the fighters.
The Americans were still around.
"They are facing heavy resistance," said Abu Nargis, who was staying at the house. He carried his baby daughter. "They will raid the area tonight."
But by 7 p.m., the Stryker had left.
Dead and Injured
At 9:05 p.m., Abu Nargis received a phone call. He said he had been told that a police commander with 500 policemen would stop working with the government and join the Mahdi Army.
At 9:09 p.m., screams tore through the street. A woman in a black abaya was walking toward the hospital, wailing: "My mother! My mother!" Her house had been hit, but it was not clear by whom. Seconds later, ambulances and police vehicles drove past the house as an unmanned U.S. drone flew by. The ambulances and police vehicles drove back, carrying dead and injured.
There was more gunfire. At 10:35 p.m., Abu Nargis received another phone call.
"The Americans are gone. Even the snipers," he said.
He headed to his bedroom. "I have to go and check on my daughter," he said. "She's afraid of the gunfire."
The next morning, Kabi was standing on a nearby street with a group of fighters, including two boys who looked no older than 13. They were getting instructions from an older fighter, who clutched an AK-47 assault rifle. They looked weary, as if they had stayed up all night.
At the edge of Sadr City, four Strykers rolled by. A white car waited patiently for the convoy to pass, then drove out. A wooden coffin was strapped to the top.
Iraqi Police captured by Mahdi Army
This is what we will do ourselves!!!!!!!!!!!
A Mahdi Army fighter guards captured Iraqi policemen during fighting between Mahdi Army and government forces in Basra, Iraq, Friday, March 28, 2008. Shiite militants clashed with government forces for a fourth day in Iraq's oil-rich south and sporadic fighting broke out in Baghdad, despite a weekend curfew in the capital.(AP Photo)
How great Ayatollahs treat their Wives
AIM ISLAM Great Article
Allamah Tabatabai [r]:Story 1‘
Allāma’s family life was extremely warm and pleasant. When his wife passed away he shed so many tears and was so saddened and moved that one day we asked him, “we should be learning patience and endurance from you - why are you affected such?”He replied:Death is inevitable. Everyone must die. I am not crying for the death of my wife. My tears are for the kindness, housekeeping abilities, and the love my wife had. I have had a life full of ups and downs. In the holy city of Najaf when we were faced with many difficulties, I was not even aware of the needs and the administration of our life [because she took care of them so well]. Managing our life was in the hands of my wife, and throughout our life not once did my wife do something that I said I wish she hadn’t done that, even just to myself. Nor did she ever not do something that I said I wish she had carried that out!Throughout our life together never once did she say to me why did you carry out that particular act, or why didn’t you do something! For example, you know that I work at home and am continually occupied with writing and studying. As a result I get tired and occasionally I need to rest and to renew my energy. My wife was aware of this. She would always have the kettle on and tea ready. Although she was busy with housework, she would pour me one cup of tea every hour. She would place it in my study and would return to her work until the following hour…how can I ever forget such love and kindness?!
Ayatullah Ibrāhīm Amīnī (author of self building)
Story 2
His [‘Allāma’s] behavior with my mother was incredibly respectful and friendly. Through his actions it seemed as if he was always eager to see my mother. We never saw them order each other to do or not do anything, nor did we see any discord between the two of them. They were loving, loyal and forgiving to each other to such an extent that we thought they never disagreed. The two of them were truly like two friends with each other.Prior to her death, my mother was ill and confined to bed for 27 days. During this period my father did not leave her bedside for a single moment. He left all his work to take care of her.At the same time my mother was an exceptional woman. She was patient when faced with difficulties and a meager lifestyle. She managed all our household affairs. She took care of our academic and social life and handled all our concerns. She worked with such efficiency and wisdom that my father was able to pursue his academic work with complete ease of mind.‘Allāma’s daughter
Story 3
“It was this woman who allowed me to reach this position. She has been my partner and whatever books I have written, half [of the credit] belongs to her.” This one sentence from ‘Allāma Tabātabā’ī is sufficient as an indication of his enlightened view of women. At another time he said:If a woman did not have importance, God would not have placed the lineage of the 12 Imāms in the progeny of Hazrat Zahra (a). Truly if a woman is noble and good she can make the entire world a rose-garden, and if she is bad she can make the world a hell…Women and men are partners, and after looking after the raising of her children, a woman must become aware and familiar with the affairs of her society.
‘Allāma Tabātabā’ī
Imam Khomeini [r]:
Observance of the rights of a wife:Imam always offered me the better place in the room. He would not start eating until I came to the dinner table. He would also tell the children: ‘Wait until Khanom comes.’ He maintained respect for me and was not even willing that I should work in the house. He would always tell me: ‘Don’t sweep.’ If I wanted to wash the children’s clothes at the pond[1], he would come and say: “Get up, you shouldn’t be washing.” On the whole, I have to say that Imam did not consider sweeping, washing dishes and even washing my children’s clothes as part of my responsibilities. If out of necessity I sometimes did these, he would get upset considering them as a type of unjust dealing towards me. Even when I entered the room, he would never say: ‘Close the door behind you,’ but waited till I sat down and then would himself get up and shut the door.[2]The Imam’s Wife60 years of living together and not one request for a glass of water:Imam had extraordinary respect for his wife. For example, I am not lying if I say that in the period of 60 years of living together, he did not even reach for food (on the dinner table) before his wife, nor did he have even the smallest expectation from her. I can even say that in the period of 60 years of living together, at no time did he even ask for a glass of water, but would always get it himself. If he was in such a position that he could not, he would say: ‘Is the water not here?’ He would never say: ‘Get up and bring me water.’ He behaved this way not only with his wife but also with all of us who were his daughters. If he ever wanted water we would all enthusiastically run to get it, but he never wanted us to bring and give him a glass of water in his hand.During the difficult last days of his life, each time he would open his eyes, if he was capable of speaking, he would ask: ‘How is Khanom?’ We would reply: ‘She is good. Shall we tell her to come to you?’ He would answer: ‘No, her back is hurting. Let her rest.’[3]
Siddiqa Mustafavi (Imam’s daughter)
Blessed am I that I have such a wife:Imam was very attached to his wife and had special respect for her, so much so that he placed his wife on one side, and his children on the other.I remember that once Imam’s wife had gone on a journey, and Imam was missing her very much. When he would frown, we would jokingly say to him: ‘When Khanom is here, Imam laughs, and when she is not here, Imam is upset and frowns.’In short, however much we teased Imam, he would not stop frowning. Finally I said: ‘Blessed is Khanom that you like her so much.’ He said: ‘Blessed am I that I have such a wife. No one else has sacrificed as much in life as she has. If you too would be like Khanom, your husband would also like you this much.’
[4]Siddiqa Mustafavi (Imam’s daughter)
I have come to wash the dishes:One day, as it so happened, there were many guests at Imam’s house. After the meal, I collected the dishes and took them to the kitchen. Along with Zahra, the daughter of Agha Ishraqi, we prepared to wash the dishes. However we saw that Imam himself had immediately come to the kitchen.I asked Zahra: “Why has Haaj Agha come to the kitchen?” I had a right to be surprised because it wasn’t time to perform wudu. Imam rolled up his sleeves and said: “Because there are many dishes today, I have come to help you.” My body started to tremble. My Lord! What am I seeing! I said to Zahra: “I swear by you to Allah, please request Imam to leave. We will wash the dishes ourselves.” This was really unexpected for me.[10]
Marzieh Hadide Chi (Dabagh)
http://al-islam.org/completeman/------The stories about Allamah Tabatabai [r] were from here: http://www.al-islam.org/eternalmanifestations/If anyone has any other inspirational stories about great scholars and how they viewed and treated their wives then please post.duas ws
----------
With the demise of Imam Khomeini on June 3rd, 1989, the world lost a great revolutionary and an unparalleled leader who awakened the Muslims, revived Islam and restored it to its pristine grandeur through his honourable and dignified life.
The Imam was a shining light in the history of Islam that continues to shine years after his demise. Millions flocked to his funeral; millions more have since congregated in mourning ceremonies and processions all over the world to pray tribute to him.
Much has been written about Imam Khomeini as a political and spiritual leader of the Islamic Revolution. However, the aim of this book is to give the reader an insight into Imam Khomeini's personal life, the man behind the scenes.
He was a perfect archetype of a complete Muslim in every facet of life. Indeed, this was a man who appealed to all levels of society and all backgrounds, especially the oppressed peoples of South Africa, Iraq and Palestine.
It is hoped, God Willing, that this compilation will be a great source of inspiration and benefit for readers from all creeds and backgrounds.
Translated by Abbas & Shaheen Merali
Holy City of Qom
Imam always offered me the better place in the room. He would not start eating until I came to the dinner table. He would also tell the children: 'Wait until Khanom comes.' He maintained respect for me and was not even willing that I should work in the house. He would always tell me: 'Don't sweep.' If I wanted to wash the children's clothes at the pond, he would come and say: “Get up, you shouldn't be washing.”
On the whole, I have to say that Imam did not consider sweeping, washing dishes and even washing my children's clothes as part of my responsibilities. If out of necessity I sometimes did these, he would get upset considering them as a type of unjust dealing towards me.
Even when I entered the room, he would never say: 'Close the door behind you,' but waited till I sat down and then would himself get up and shut the door.
The Imam's Wife
60 years of living together and not one request for a glass of water:
Imam had extraordinary respect for his wife. For example, I am not lying if I say that in the period of 60 years of living together, he did not even reach for food (on the dinner table) before his wife, nor did he have even the smallest expectation from her. I can even say that in the period of 60 years of living together, at no time did he even ask for a glass of water, but would always get it himself. If he was in such a position that he could not, he would say: 'Is the water not here?' He would never say: 'Get up and bring me water.' He behaved this way not only with his wife but also with all of us who were his daughters. If he ever wanted water we would all enthusiastically run to get it, but he never wanted us to bring and give him a glass of water in his hand.
During the difficult last days of his life, each time he would open his eyes, if he was capable of speaking, he would ask: 'How is Khanom?' We would reply: 'She is good. Shall we tell her to come to you?' He would answer: 'No, her back is hurting. Let her rest.' Siddiqa Mustafavi (Imam's daughter)
Blessed am I that I have such a wife:
Imam was very attached to his wife and had special respect for her, so much so that he placed his wife on one side, and his children on the other.
I remember that once Imam's wife had gone on a journey, and Imam was missing her very much. When he would frown, we would jokingly say to him: 'When Khanom is here, Imam laughs, and when she is not here, Imam is upset and frowns.'
In short, however much we teased Imam, he would not stop frowning. Finally I said: 'Blessed is Khanom that you like her so much.' He said: 'Blessed am I that I have such a wife. No one else has sacrificed as much in life as she has. If you too would be like Khanom, your husband would also like you this much.'
Siddiqa Mustafavi (Imam's daughter)
He would never pass on his work to anyone else:
As far as possible, Imam was particular that he should not impose his work on others, but rather carry it out himself. In Najaf, it sometimes happened that from the roof, Imam would notice that the kitchen or bathroom light was left on.
In these cases, he would not tell his wife or anybody else who was also on the roof to go and switch off the light. Rather, he would himself make his way down three flights of stairs in the darkness, switch off the light and return.
Occasionally, he would also want a pen or paper that was upstairs. In this circumstance too, he would not tell anyone, not even his loved ones the children of Martyr Marhum Haaj Sayyid Mustafa (Imam's son), to bring them for him. He would himself get up and go up the stairs to get what he needed and return.
Hujjatul Islam Sayyid Hamid Ruhani
Imam is not crying at all:
It was around Dhuhr on the day that Marhum Haaj Agha Mustafa had passed away. Imam's house was full of people who had come to offer their condolences. When everyone had left, the Adhaan of Dhuhr was heard. Imam got up and went to do wudu and said: “I am going to the mosque.” I said: “Oh, Agha is not leaving his habit of praying congregational prayers even today.” I then said to one of the servants: “Quickly go and let the caretaker of the mosque know.”
When the people realised that Imam was going to the mosque, crowds of people from all over also flocked there. When we reached the mosque with Agha, the people who were crying and wailing opened the way and the Imam entered the mosque. The people remarked to each other with surprise: “What is this? Imam is not crying at all.”
Hujjatul Islam Furqani
I was scared that I would cry for other than Allah:
On the night of the martyrdom of Marhum Haaj Agha Mustafa, a Fatiha majlis (a service of prayer and condolence) took place in the Hindi Mosque in Najaf, and Agha Sayyid Jawad Shabbar recited from the pulpit. He narrates:
In that majlis in which Imam was also present, I narrated the masaib of Hazrat Ali Akbar (as), and also mentioned it 7 times from the pulpit, connecting it to my lecture. Imam sat throughout the majlis with complete calm.
Agha Sayyid Jawad Shabbar had wanted to make the Imam cry with these narrations so that his heart would become light, but he wasn't successful despite the fact that it (the death of his son) was a major calamity. A number of people who witnessed the Imam's state thought that Imam was not crying because he was in a state of shock from the heavy calamity. Therefore, after the majlis they went to the Imam who had returned home and asked: “Agha, you didn't cry at the masaib today?” He replied: “When he was reciting the masaib he was looking at me, and I was scared that if I cry it would be for other than Allah, i.e. it would be for the tragedy of my son, and not for the pleasure of Allah.”
Hujjatul Islam Sayyid Murtaza Musawi Ardabili Abarkuhi
Why is Hassan dishevelled like this?
Imam acted exactly according to all the instructions that he gave from the start, and in actuality, was an embodiment of those very instructions. He himself was the book 'Forty Hadith' that he had written in his youth. Suppose he spoke about riya (performing any action for the purpose of other than the pleasure of Allah) and reproached it, he himself would stay away from it with intensity.
I remember one day my son entered the house wearing trousers which I had patched up at one knee. Imam asked: “Why is Hassan dishevelled like this?” I jokingly replied: “It's the life of poor people, Agha.”
Immediately, his face became drawn, and he said: “You don't want to do riya.” I said: “No, why riya?” He said: “Be careful. Not paying attention to outward physical appearances has value. However, if you want to show (people) that I am such and such, it is riya.”
Imam said this sentence to me with the same intensity with which he had, at the age of 30 years, written in his book!
Fatema Tabatabai (Imam's daughter-in-law)
I have come to wash the dishes
One day, as it so happened, there were many guests at Imam's house. After the meal, I collected the dishes and took them to the kitchen. Along with Zahra, the daughter of Agha Ishraqi, we prepared to wash the dishes. However we saw that Imam himself had immediately come to the kitchen.
I asked Zahra: “Why has Haaj Agha come to the kitchen?” I had a right to be surprised because it wasn't time to perform wudu. Imam rolled up his sleeves and said: “Because there are many dishes today, I have come to help you.” My body started to tremble. My Lord! What am I seeing! I said to Zahra: “I swear by you to Allah, please request Imam to leave. We will wash the dishes ourselves.” This was really unexpected for me.
Marzieh Hadide Chi (Dabagh)
A piece of advice to solve family issues:
One of Imam's daughters narrates: “At the start of my marriage, I went to Haaj Agha so that he could give me some advice. He said: “If your husband is upset, or if he says something to you for whatever reason, or acts badly, at that time don't say anything, even if you are in the right. Leave it until he has calmed down, and then say what you have to.” He also gave the exact same advice to my husband.
In the beginning I didn't give this advice much importance. Later upon reflection, I saw that indeed the root of many of the family disputes came back to this very issue. Therefore, from then on, every time somebody has wanted advice about family issues, I have given them this very same advice of the Imam.
Hujjatul Islam Muhammad Hassan Murtadhavi Langarudi
Worn away bricks:
The simplicity of Imam's house in Qom during his life was an indication of his contentment.
It is well known that the bricks of the courtyard stairs were worn away. A builder had advised: “Get a number of bricks made so that these worn away ones can be replaced.” Imam responded: “Turn these worn away bricks around and let them be.”
Ayatullah Bani Fadhl
Allamah Tabatabai [r]:Story 1‘
Allāma’s family life was extremely warm and pleasant. When his wife passed away he shed so many tears and was so saddened and moved that one day we asked him, “we should be learning patience and endurance from you - why are you affected such?”He replied:Death is inevitable. Everyone must die. I am not crying for the death of my wife. My tears are for the kindness, housekeeping abilities, and the love my wife had. I have had a life full of ups and downs. In the holy city of Najaf when we were faced with many difficulties, I was not even aware of the needs and the administration of our life [because she took care of them so well]. Managing our life was in the hands of my wife, and throughout our life not once did my wife do something that I said I wish she hadn’t done that, even just to myself. Nor did she ever not do something that I said I wish she had carried that out!Throughout our life together never once did she say to me why did you carry out that particular act, or why didn’t you do something! For example, you know that I work at home and am continually occupied with writing and studying. As a result I get tired and occasionally I need to rest and to renew my energy. My wife was aware of this. She would always have the kettle on and tea ready. Although she was busy with housework, she would pour me one cup of tea every hour. She would place it in my study and would return to her work until the following hour…how can I ever forget such love and kindness?!
Ayatullah Ibrāhīm Amīnī (author of self building)
Story 2
His [‘Allāma’s] behavior with my mother was incredibly respectful and friendly. Through his actions it seemed as if he was always eager to see my mother. We never saw them order each other to do or not do anything, nor did we see any discord between the two of them. They were loving, loyal and forgiving to each other to such an extent that we thought they never disagreed. The two of them were truly like two friends with each other.Prior to her death, my mother was ill and confined to bed for 27 days. During this period my father did not leave her bedside for a single moment. He left all his work to take care of her.At the same time my mother was an exceptional woman. She was patient when faced with difficulties and a meager lifestyle. She managed all our household affairs. She took care of our academic and social life and handled all our concerns. She worked with such efficiency and wisdom that my father was able to pursue his academic work with complete ease of mind.‘Allāma’s daughter
Story 3
“It was this woman who allowed me to reach this position. She has been my partner and whatever books I have written, half [of the credit] belongs to her.” This one sentence from ‘Allāma Tabātabā’ī is sufficient as an indication of his enlightened view of women. At another time he said:If a woman did not have importance, God would not have placed the lineage of the 12 Imāms in the progeny of Hazrat Zahra (a). Truly if a woman is noble and good she can make the entire world a rose-garden, and if she is bad she can make the world a hell…Women and men are partners, and after looking after the raising of her children, a woman must become aware and familiar with the affairs of her society.
‘Allāma Tabātabā’ī
Imam Khomeini [r]:
Observance of the rights of a wife:Imam always offered me the better place in the room. He would not start eating until I came to the dinner table. He would also tell the children: ‘Wait until Khanom comes.’ He maintained respect for me and was not even willing that I should work in the house. He would always tell me: ‘Don’t sweep.’ If I wanted to wash the children’s clothes at the pond[1], he would come and say: “Get up, you shouldn’t be washing.” On the whole, I have to say that Imam did not consider sweeping, washing dishes and even washing my children’s clothes as part of my responsibilities. If out of necessity I sometimes did these, he would get upset considering them as a type of unjust dealing towards me. Even when I entered the room, he would never say: ‘Close the door behind you,’ but waited till I sat down and then would himself get up and shut the door.[2]The Imam’s Wife60 years of living together and not one request for a glass of water:Imam had extraordinary respect for his wife. For example, I am not lying if I say that in the period of 60 years of living together, he did not even reach for food (on the dinner table) before his wife, nor did he have even the smallest expectation from her. I can even say that in the period of 60 years of living together, at no time did he even ask for a glass of water, but would always get it himself. If he was in such a position that he could not, he would say: ‘Is the water not here?’ He would never say: ‘Get up and bring me water.’ He behaved this way not only with his wife but also with all of us who were his daughters. If he ever wanted water we would all enthusiastically run to get it, but he never wanted us to bring and give him a glass of water in his hand.During the difficult last days of his life, each time he would open his eyes, if he was capable of speaking, he would ask: ‘How is Khanom?’ We would reply: ‘She is good. Shall we tell her to come to you?’ He would answer: ‘No, her back is hurting. Let her rest.’[3]
Siddiqa Mustafavi (Imam’s daughter)
Blessed am I that I have such a wife:Imam was very attached to his wife and had special respect for her, so much so that he placed his wife on one side, and his children on the other.I remember that once Imam’s wife had gone on a journey, and Imam was missing her very much. When he would frown, we would jokingly say to him: ‘When Khanom is here, Imam laughs, and when she is not here, Imam is upset and frowns.’In short, however much we teased Imam, he would not stop frowning. Finally I said: ‘Blessed is Khanom that you like her so much.’ He said: ‘Blessed am I that I have such a wife. No one else has sacrificed as much in life as she has. If you too would be like Khanom, your husband would also like you this much.’
[4]Siddiqa Mustafavi (Imam’s daughter)
I have come to wash the dishes:One day, as it so happened, there were many guests at Imam’s house. After the meal, I collected the dishes and took them to the kitchen. Along with Zahra, the daughter of Agha Ishraqi, we prepared to wash the dishes. However we saw that Imam himself had immediately come to the kitchen.I asked Zahra: “Why has Haaj Agha come to the kitchen?” I had a right to be surprised because it wasn’t time to perform wudu. Imam rolled up his sleeves and said: “Because there are many dishes today, I have come to help you.” My body started to tremble. My Lord! What am I seeing! I said to Zahra: “I swear by you to Allah, please request Imam to leave. We will wash the dishes ourselves.” This was really unexpected for me.[10]
Marzieh Hadide Chi (Dabagh)
http://al-islam.org/completeman/------The stories about Allamah Tabatabai [r] were from here: http://www.al-islam.org/eternalmanifestations/If anyone has any other inspirational stories about great scholars and how they viewed and treated their wives then please post.duas ws
----------
Rays Of The Sun
With the demise of Imam Khomeini on June 3rd, 1989, the world lost a great revolutionary and an unparalleled leader who awakened the Muslims, revived Islam and restored it to its pristine grandeur through his honourable and dignified life.
The Imam was a shining light in the history of Islam that continues to shine years after his demise. Millions flocked to his funeral; millions more have since congregated in mourning ceremonies and processions all over the world to pray tribute to him.
Much has been written about Imam Khomeini as a political and spiritual leader of the Islamic Revolution. However, the aim of this book is to give the reader an insight into Imam Khomeini's personal life, the man behind the scenes.
He was a perfect archetype of a complete Muslim in every facet of life. Indeed, this was a man who appealed to all levels of society and all backgrounds, especially the oppressed peoples of South Africa, Iraq and Palestine.
It is hoped, God Willing, that this compilation will be a great source of inspiration and benefit for readers from all creeds and backgrounds.
Translated by Abbas & Shaheen Merali
Holy City of Qom
Observance of the rights of a wife:
Imam always offered me the better place in the room. He would not start eating until I came to the dinner table. He would also tell the children: 'Wait until Khanom comes.' He maintained respect for me and was not even willing that I should work in the house. He would always tell me: 'Don't sweep.' If I wanted to wash the children's clothes at the pond, he would come and say: “Get up, you shouldn't be washing.”
On the whole, I have to say that Imam did not consider sweeping, washing dishes and even washing my children's clothes as part of my responsibilities. If out of necessity I sometimes did these, he would get upset considering them as a type of unjust dealing towards me.
Even when I entered the room, he would never say: 'Close the door behind you,' but waited till I sat down and then would himself get up and shut the door.
The Imam's Wife
60 years of living together and not one request for a glass of water:
Imam had extraordinary respect for his wife. For example, I am not lying if I say that in the period of 60 years of living together, he did not even reach for food (on the dinner table) before his wife, nor did he have even the smallest expectation from her. I can even say that in the period of 60 years of living together, at no time did he even ask for a glass of water, but would always get it himself. If he was in such a position that he could not, he would say: 'Is the water not here?' He would never say: 'Get up and bring me water.' He behaved this way not only with his wife but also with all of us who were his daughters. If he ever wanted water we would all enthusiastically run to get it, but he never wanted us to bring and give him a glass of water in his hand.
During the difficult last days of his life, each time he would open his eyes, if he was capable of speaking, he would ask: 'How is Khanom?' We would reply: 'She is good. Shall we tell her to come to you?' He would answer: 'No, her back is hurting. Let her rest.' Siddiqa Mustafavi (Imam's daughter)
Blessed am I that I have such a wife:
Imam was very attached to his wife and had special respect for her, so much so that he placed his wife on one side, and his children on the other.
I remember that once Imam's wife had gone on a journey, and Imam was missing her very much. When he would frown, we would jokingly say to him: 'When Khanom is here, Imam laughs, and when she is not here, Imam is upset and frowns.'
In short, however much we teased Imam, he would not stop frowning. Finally I said: 'Blessed is Khanom that you like her so much.' He said: 'Blessed am I that I have such a wife. No one else has sacrificed as much in life as she has. If you too would be like Khanom, your husband would also like you this much.'
Siddiqa Mustafavi (Imam's daughter)
He would never pass on his work to anyone else:
As far as possible, Imam was particular that he should not impose his work on others, but rather carry it out himself. In Najaf, it sometimes happened that from the roof, Imam would notice that the kitchen or bathroom light was left on.
In these cases, he would not tell his wife or anybody else who was also on the roof to go and switch off the light. Rather, he would himself make his way down three flights of stairs in the darkness, switch off the light and return.
Occasionally, he would also want a pen or paper that was upstairs. In this circumstance too, he would not tell anyone, not even his loved ones the children of Martyr Marhum Haaj Sayyid Mustafa (Imam's son), to bring them for him. He would himself get up and go up the stairs to get what he needed and return.
Hujjatul Islam Sayyid Hamid Ruhani
Imam is not crying at all:
It was around Dhuhr on the day that Marhum Haaj Agha Mustafa had passed away. Imam's house was full of people who had come to offer their condolences. When everyone had left, the Adhaan of Dhuhr was heard. Imam got up and went to do wudu and said: “I am going to the mosque.” I said: “Oh, Agha is not leaving his habit of praying congregational prayers even today.” I then said to one of the servants: “Quickly go and let the caretaker of the mosque know.”
When the people realised that Imam was going to the mosque, crowds of people from all over also flocked there. When we reached the mosque with Agha, the people who were crying and wailing opened the way and the Imam entered the mosque. The people remarked to each other with surprise: “What is this? Imam is not crying at all.”
Hujjatul Islam Furqani
I was scared that I would cry for other than Allah:
On the night of the martyrdom of Marhum Haaj Agha Mustafa, a Fatiha majlis (a service of prayer and condolence) took place in the Hindi Mosque in Najaf, and Agha Sayyid Jawad Shabbar recited from the pulpit. He narrates:
In that majlis in which Imam was also present, I narrated the masaib of Hazrat Ali Akbar (as), and also mentioned it 7 times from the pulpit, connecting it to my lecture. Imam sat throughout the majlis with complete calm.
Agha Sayyid Jawad Shabbar had wanted to make the Imam cry with these narrations so that his heart would become light, but he wasn't successful despite the fact that it (the death of his son) was a major calamity. A number of people who witnessed the Imam's state thought that Imam was not crying because he was in a state of shock from the heavy calamity. Therefore, after the majlis they went to the Imam who had returned home and asked: “Agha, you didn't cry at the masaib today?” He replied: “When he was reciting the masaib he was looking at me, and I was scared that if I cry it would be for other than Allah, i.e. it would be for the tragedy of my son, and not for the pleasure of Allah.”
Hujjatul Islam Sayyid Murtaza Musawi Ardabili Abarkuhi
Why is Hassan dishevelled like this?
Imam acted exactly according to all the instructions that he gave from the start, and in actuality, was an embodiment of those very instructions. He himself was the book 'Forty Hadith' that he had written in his youth. Suppose he spoke about riya (performing any action for the purpose of other than the pleasure of Allah) and reproached it, he himself would stay away from it with intensity.
I remember one day my son entered the house wearing trousers which I had patched up at one knee. Imam asked: “Why is Hassan dishevelled like this?” I jokingly replied: “It's the life of poor people, Agha.”
Immediately, his face became drawn, and he said: “You don't want to do riya.” I said: “No, why riya?” He said: “Be careful. Not paying attention to outward physical appearances has value. However, if you want to show (people) that I am such and such, it is riya.”
Imam said this sentence to me with the same intensity with which he had, at the age of 30 years, written in his book!
Fatema Tabatabai (Imam's daughter-in-law)
I have come to wash the dishes
One day, as it so happened, there were many guests at Imam's house. After the meal, I collected the dishes and took them to the kitchen. Along with Zahra, the daughter of Agha Ishraqi, we prepared to wash the dishes. However we saw that Imam himself had immediately come to the kitchen.
I asked Zahra: “Why has Haaj Agha come to the kitchen?” I had a right to be surprised because it wasn't time to perform wudu. Imam rolled up his sleeves and said: “Because there are many dishes today, I have come to help you.” My body started to tremble. My Lord! What am I seeing! I said to Zahra: “I swear by you to Allah, please request Imam to leave. We will wash the dishes ourselves.” This was really unexpected for me.
Marzieh Hadide Chi (Dabagh)
A piece of advice to solve family issues:
One of Imam's daughters narrates: “At the start of my marriage, I went to Haaj Agha so that he could give me some advice. He said: “If your husband is upset, or if he says something to you for whatever reason, or acts badly, at that time don't say anything, even if you are in the right. Leave it until he has calmed down, and then say what you have to.” He also gave the exact same advice to my husband.
In the beginning I didn't give this advice much importance. Later upon reflection, I saw that indeed the root of many of the family disputes came back to this very issue. Therefore, from then on, every time somebody has wanted advice about family issues, I have given them this very same advice of the Imam.
Hujjatul Islam Muhammad Hassan Murtadhavi Langarudi
Worn away bricks:
The simplicity of Imam's house in Qom during his life was an indication of his contentment.
It is well known that the bricks of the courtyard stairs were worn away. A builder had advised: “Get a number of bricks made so that these worn away ones can be replaced.” Imam responded: “Turn these worn away bricks around and let them be.”
Ayatullah Bani Fadhl
Tow Sunni Vice President's Home Under Rocket Attack -Green Zone
Tow Sunni Vice President's Home Under Mortar Attack -green Zone
2 Guards died
Office of Iraq Vice President hit in missile attack
28 Mar 2008 12:32:42 GMT 28 Mar 2008 12:32:42 GMT ## for search indexer, do not remove
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Source: Reuters
(Corrects to make clear that the missile hit the office of the Iraqi vice president, not the speaker of parliament)
BAGHDAD, March 28 (Reuters) - The office of Iraqi Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi was hit in a mortar or rocket strike on Baghdad's Green Zone government and diplomatic compound on Friday, and a security guard was killed, an official in his office said.
Hashemi was not in the office and nor were any of his staff as it was the Muslim Friday holiday, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. (Reporting by Waleed Ibrahim; Editing by Kevin Liffey)
2 Guards died
Office of Iraq Vice President hit in missile attack
28 Mar 2008 12:32:42 GMT 28 Mar 2008 12:32:42 GMT ## for search indexer, do not remove
-->
Source: Reuters
(Corrects to make clear that the missile hit the office of the Iraqi vice president, not the speaker of parliament)
BAGHDAD, March 28 (Reuters) - The office of Iraqi Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi was hit in a mortar or rocket strike on Baghdad's Green Zone government and diplomatic compound on Friday, and a security guard was killed, an official in his office said.
Hashemi was not in the office and nor were any of his staff as it was the Muslim Friday holiday, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. (Reporting by Waleed Ibrahim; Editing by Kevin Liffey)
Thursday, March 27, 2008
105 killed in battles in Shiite areas of Iraq
by Karim Jamil 2 hours, 57 minutes ago
BASRA, Iraq (AFP) - Fighting rocked two Iraq cities on Thursday as security forces battled Shiite militiamen for a third day in clashes that left 105 people dead, while saboteurs blew up a key oil export pipeline.
Fighting which began on Tuesday in Basra when Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki ordered his troops to crack down on "lawless gangs", spread on Thursday to the central city of Kut where at least 44 people died in early morning fighting, police said.
In Baghdad, meanwhile, Sadr's followers staged noisy protests against the crackdown in Basra, demanding the resignation of Maliki, who is overseeing the military operations.
The police chief of Kut, Abdul Hanin al-Amara, told AFP that among those killed during a military assault that began around midnight were four policemen and 40 Shiite militiamen.
"The security forces launched an operation at around midnight (2100 GMT Wednesday) to take back areas under the control of Shiite gunmen," Amara said in Kut, 175 kilometres (110 miles) southeast of Baghdad.
"At least 40 gunmen and four policemen were killed. Around 75 people were wounded. Police have now imposed full control on these neighbourhoods."
The offensive followed days of sporadic clashes in Kut, between militiamen and Iraqi troops, during which according to witnesses gunmen ran through the streets, burning shops and public buildings.
An AFP correspondent in Basra, meanwhile, said heavy fighting erupted early Thursday in the central Jumhuriyah neighbourhood, a Mahdi Army bastion, which was rocked by rocket propelled grenade, mortar and small arms fire.
Police spokesman Colonel Karim al-Zaidi said the convoy of Basra police chief Major General Abdul Jalil Khalaf was hit by a suicide car bomber around 1:00 am on Thursday (2200 GMT Wednesday) as it passed through the streets of Basra.
The International Committee of the Red Cross put the toll from the Basra clashes at 20 dead but other, unconfirmed reports said 40 were killed.
The port city was covered in a thick black pall of smoke on Thursday from a blast which damaged an oil pipeline transporting crude from the Zubair oil field to the Al-Faw storage facility.
Samir al-Maksusi, spokesman for the Southern Oil Company, said the pipeline had been blown up with a bomb. "The blast directly affects the exports," he said.
In the central city of Hilla, where Iraqi forces have been battling Shiite militiamen, four policemen were killed in a bomb attack, police said.
Meanwhile in Sadr City, an impoverished Shiite district of around two million people in east Baghdad, crowds gathered from 10:00 am (0700 GMT) outside the Sadr office to yell slogans against the prime minister.
"Maliki you are a coward! Maliki is an American agent! Leave the government, Maliki! How can you strike Basra?" the crowd chanted.
In the Kadhimiyah neighbourhood of north Baghdad, followers of Sadr carried a coffin covered in red fabric with an attached photograph of Maliki set against the background of an American flag.
Officials said the death toll from clashes in Sadr City Tuesday and Wednesday had risen to 30.
The Sadr movement had announced on Wednesday it would hold protest rallies against Maliki in Baghdad and the southern city of Amara, while Sadr has threatened to launch a civil revolt if the attacks against the militiamen are not halted.
On Wednesday, Maliki gave militiamen battling his forces in Basra 72 hours to lay down their arms and warned that those failing to do so would face the full brunt of the law.
Basra has become the theatre of a bitter turf war between the Mahdi Army and two rival Shiite factions -- the powerful Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC) of Abdel Aziz al-Hakim and the smaller Fadhila party.
An aide to Sadr said representatives of the Iraqi government and a Sadrist official held preliminary talks by telephone on Thursday in a bid to end the crisis in Basra.
Iraqi and US embassy officials, meanwhile said insurgents fired rockets into the heavily fortified Baghdad Green Zone causing a major blaze.
The Green Zone, which was once Saddam Hussein's presidential compound, has been repeatedly hit by rocket and mortar fire in recent days, wounding at least three Americans.
Voice for Abused Women Upsets Dubai Patriarchy
Sharla Musabih, right, the founder of City of Hope, Dubai’s first women’s shelter, said goodbye to a departing resident last July.
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — For years, Sharla Musabih has fought a lonely battle to protect battered wives and victims of human trafficking here. She founded the Emirates’ first women’s shelter here and she became a familiar figure at police stations, relentlessly hounding officers to be tougher on abusive husbands.
Tamara Abdul Hadi for The New York Times
Ms. Musabih with a shelter resident’s child. Her aggressiveness stands out, as does her habit of calling her charges “darlin’.”
She has also earned many enemies. Emiratis do not often take kindly to rights advocates drawing attention to the dark side of their fast-growing city-state on the Persian Gulf, better known for its gleaming office towers and artificial islands.
Still, no one was quite prepared for the stories that started appearing in Dubai newspapers this month. Suddenly, unidentified female victims were coming forward to say that “Mama Sharla” herself had abused them, forced them to work as servants and sold their stories to foreign journalists for thousands of dollars, pocketing the proceeds. She even sold one woman’s baby, the articles said, hinting at criminal investigations.
To Ms. Musabih and her supporters, the accusations, which appear to be baseless, are the latest chapter in a long campaign of threats and defamation that began with angry husbands and has grown to include prominent clerics, and even the directors of a new government-financed women’s shelter, who, she says, would like to silence her.
The ferocity of the dispute is unusual for Dubai, and underscores a major challenge facing this proudly apolitical business capital. The city’s few rights advocates have always been quietly shunted aside. But as the conservative Muslim ethos of Dubai’s native Arab minority rubs against the varied perspectives of a much larger foreign population, debates about how to approach taboo subjects like domestic violence and the city’s prevalent prostitution are getting louder.
Battling Tradition
Ms. Musabih, 47, a boisterous American transplant who was born and raised on Bainbridge Island, Wash., argues that confrontation is essential in fighting the patriarchal Arab traditions that allow men to beat their wives with impunity. She and her supporters also say the Emirates have not acknowledged the severity of their problem with human trafficking, the brutal business in which foreign women are lured here with promises of jobs and then forced into prostitution or servitude. Last year the United States State Department placed the Emirates and 31 other countries on a watch list for failing to effectively combat the illegal trade.
“When a woman has three broken bones in her back, and the police don’t take it seriously, yes, I get angry,” Ms. Musabih said.
Others say Ms. Musabih’s aggressive approach — which includes appeals to foreign news media as well as tough, face-to-face lobbying — is inappropriate in the Arab world, and has needlessly fueled the backlash she now faces. That assertiveness may also have made it easier to dismiss her as an outsider. Although she has lived here for 24 years, converted to Islam, is an Emirati citizen, wears a veil and has raised six children here with her Emirati husband, Ms. Musabih is still unmistakably American, from her moralistic zeal to her habit of calling the women in her shelter “darlin’.”
“I have told her sometimes I think she is wrong, she goes too far,” said Lt. Gen. Dahi al-Khalfan, the chief of the Dubai Police, who has supported Ms. Musabih in the past but now tends to criticize her work as divisive. “There is a case between husband and wife; let the court decide! Leave it.”
Safety and a Ticket Home
Ms. Musabih dates her work as an advocate from 1991, when she started tracking domestic violence cases and offering women shelter in her home in Dubai. In 2001, she rented a two-story house in the Jumeira district and opened a shelter for abused women and their children, naming it City of Hope.
On a recent afternoon, children’s toys littered the floors in the shelter’s sunlit living room, and several women snacked in the kitchen, while others sprawled on couches watching television upstairs. Although Ms. Musabih has had some dedicated assistants over the years, it is basically a one-woman show; she deals with everything from belligerent former husbands to buying plane tickets, sometimes with her own money, for foreign women to return to their home countries.
“I’ve repatriated 400 victims in the past six months,” said Ms. Musabih, a fast-talking, energetic figure who presides over the shelter like an overworked mother.
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Establishing the shelter was unusual enough in the Arab world, where going outside the family to resolve domestic conflicts has little basis in law or custom. Ms. Musabih’s personal advocacy made her work even more startling. She would counsel women to leave their husbands if they were being beaten, and help represent them in courts or foreign consulates.
She would also march into police stations and yell at officers if she felt they were not protecting women in danger. In the Arab world it is virtually unheard of for a woman to behave this way toward a man, and the officers sometimes felt they had been publicly humiliated.
Some women who have spent time in the shelter say this tough approach is necessary. The police in Dubai “won’t do anything to protect you while you’re legally married,” said one former resident of the shelter, who declined to give her name because she still fears repercussions, from her husband and from others who oppose Ms. Musabih.
After her husband beat her repeatedly, the woman said, she appealed to the police, who made her husband sign a promise that he would not do it again. He violated the pledge again and again, she said, but the police did nothing, even after he broke into another house where she was seeking refuge and raped her.
“The police told me, ‘We can’t do anything, he’s your husband,’ ” she said.
But Ms. Musabih’s approach clearly shocked and angered many, and not just the husbands whose wives found shelter.
A prominent cleric, Ahmed al-Kobeissi, recently gave interviews to Dubai newspapers in which he said Ms. Musabih’s work “goes against the traditions of Emirati people” because she “instigates wives against their husbands.” Mr. Kobeissi also voiced indignation at Ms. Musabih’s suggestion that Emirati men are among the clients of Dubai’s many prostitutes.
Ms. Musabih’s work took on a higher public profile when she joined a crusade against the practice of using children, some as young as 4, as camel jockeys, once common in the Persian Gulf. Her advocacy led to a number of television and newspaper reports about the horrific abuses practiced on young jockeys, and appears to have helped lead to a ban on the practice in the Emirates in 2005.
Ms. Musabih is full of praise for the Emirati government’s response on this issue, and says it responded quickly and effectively to her appeals to change the laws. But her highly public approach to the problem is said to have angered some influential Emiratis, who felt she had embarrassed the leadership instead of allowing the matter to be settled quietly.
In the early spring of 2007, government officials approached Ms. Musabih about plans for a new state-sanctioned women’s shelter, apparently intended to replace hers. At first she welcomed the idea, because her shelter was often crowded and she was struggling to manage financially. They praised her pioneering work and said she could help direct the new shelter as a board member.
As the project evolved, it became clear that the government’s approach was vastly different from Ms. Musabih’s. It hired a director with a background in management and a more subdued style. On the grounds of an old rehabilitation center 20 minutes from Dubai with high fences and guards, the new shelter, known as the Dubai Foundation for Women and Children, resembles an American low-security prison.
Ahmed al-Mansouri, the chairman of the foundation’s board, says there was a need for a more organized approach and a shelter that, unlike Ms. Musabih’s, was licensed by the government. He says she was not making adequate progress on the legal cases of the women in her shelter, a claim she vehemently disputes. He also describes the familial chaos of the City of Hope shelter as a “horrible way of living.”
Certainly, the new shelter is more spacious, and has better access to schooling for the women’s children.
Feeling of Betrayal
In October, buses arrived at City of Hope and they moved 35 women to the foundation shelter.
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But Ms. Musabih soon began to feel that the directors of the new shelter had betrayed her and were negligent with the women in some cases, a claim the foundation denies. She says the foundation was more interested in getting foreign women back to their home countries with a minimum of embarrassment, than in investigating wrongs that had been done to them and preventing those wrongs from recurring.
If the new shelter was meant to replace Ms. Musabih and quiet her down, it became clear over the following months that it would not work. City of Hope continued to take in new women, and as Ms. Musabih kept criticizing the Dubai Foundation’s approach, her relations with its directors became steadily nastier.
When one of the women who was moved to the foundation tried to commit suicide in December, Ms. Musabih accused its staff of negligence. After a heated exchange, the foundation’s director, Afra al-Basti, sued Ms. Musabih for slander.
It was then that the scandalous articles about Ms. Musabih began appearing in Dubai newspapers.
The sources for those articles appear to have been women at the foundation shelter who, like some of their counterparts at the City of Hope, are vulnerable or unstable, and have been drawn into the dispute boiling around them. Some speak no English or Arabic, and are easily manipulated. How exactly they came to spread false stories about Ms. Musabih’s selling babies or taking thousands of dollars from foreign journalists is still not clear.
Ms. Musabih, speaking by phone from Ethiopia, where she is setting up a shelter, said she felt betrayed.
“I never thought it would go this far,” she said. “These people think I’m an enemy of the state and that I need to be controlled.”
But even some of her supporters wonder whether Ms. Musabih, for all her pioneering accomplishments, could not have avoided all the ugliness if she had been willing to do things more quietly.
“With Sharla, it is ‘No, I am right,’ and she always deals with people straight on,” said Awatif Badreddine, a supervisor at City of Hope. “But I tell her you have to deal with people differently here. The Arabs don’t like this. Sometimes you have to go around to get what you want.”
Wednesday, March 26, 2008
Many killed by U.S. strike in Iraq's Hilla
-sources 26 Mar 2008 19:39:48 GMT
Source: Reuters
(Adds U.S. spokeswoman)
HILLA, Iraq, March 26 (Reuters) - Many people were killed or wounded by a U.S. air strike called to support Iraqi forces in the town of Hilla south of Baghdad on Wednesday, Iraqi security sources said.
U.S. forces confirmed the air strike and said they were not certain how many people had been killed but denied that there were large numbers of casualties.
One police source said at least 11 people were killed and 18 wounded in the strike, launched after Iraqi security forces called for support following street battles with Shi'ite militia members in the city's Thawra neighbourhood.
Another police source said 29 people were killed and 39 were wounded. He said six houses were destroyed in the strikes which lasted for an hour late on Wednesday evening.
Two other security sources said the combined total of dead and wounded was in the dozens, although they were unable to give precise casualty figures. All of the sources spoke under condition they not be named, as is usual practice in Iraq.
Major Allayne Conway, spokeswoman for U.S. forces south of Baghdad, said U.S. helicopters had responded to a call for help from SWAT special police units in Hilla.
"The Hilla SWAT guys were on the ground. They were engaged. Our attack helicopters were called in. They engaged," she said.
"We're still checking how many enemy personnel were killed. The initial report I had was four."
Iraqi security forces have battled Shi'ite militia in several southern cities and Shi'ite areas of Baghdad for the past two days. (Reporting by Sami al-Jumaily and Habib al-Zubaidy; writing by Peter Graff; editing by Sami Aboudi)
Source: Reuters
(Adds U.S. spokeswoman)
HILLA, Iraq, March 26 (Reuters) - Many people were killed or wounded by a U.S. air strike called to support Iraqi forces in the town of Hilla south of Baghdad on Wednesday, Iraqi security sources said.
U.S. forces confirmed the air strike and said they were not certain how many people had been killed but denied that there were large numbers of casualties.
One police source said at least 11 people were killed and 18 wounded in the strike, launched after Iraqi security forces called for support following street battles with Shi'ite militia members in the city's Thawra neighbourhood.
Another police source said 29 people were killed and 39 were wounded. He said six houses were destroyed in the strikes which lasted for an hour late on Wednesday evening.
Two other security sources said the combined total of dead and wounded was in the dozens, although they were unable to give precise casualty figures. All of the sources spoke under condition they not be named, as is usual practice in Iraq.
Major Allayne Conway, spokeswoman for U.S. forces south of Baghdad, said U.S. helicopters had responded to a call for help from SWAT special police units in Hilla.
"The Hilla SWAT guys were on the ground. They were engaged. Our attack helicopters were called in. They engaged," she said.
"We're still checking how many enemy personnel were killed. The initial report I had was four."
Iraqi security forces have battled Shi'ite militia in several southern cities and Shi'ite areas of Baghdad for the past two days. (Reporting by Sami al-Jumaily and Habib al-Zubaidy; writing by Peter Graff; editing by Sami Aboudi)
AP IMPACT: Shiite enclave back on edge
By HAMZA HENDAWI and QASSIM ABDUL-ZAHRA, Associated Press Writers
39 minutes ago
BAGHDAD - Shiite militiamen are everywhere. Police and Iraqi army checkpoints are nowhere in sight. U.S. soldiers are keeping their distance.
Sadr City — the Baghdad nerve center for the powerful Mahdi Army — is suddenly back on edge as the militia leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, and Iraq's government lock in a dangerous confrontation over clout and control among the nation's majority Shiites.
The epicenter of the showdown has been the southern oil hub of Basra, where clashes have claimed dozens of lives this week and al-Sadr's forces face a Friday deadline to surrender.
But a more finely tuned measure of the tensions may be found among the one- and two-story homes and shabby storefronts of Sadr City. As the crisis deepened, The Associated Press toured Sadr City on Wednesday to observe its rapid swing from relative quiet to a return of the Mahdi Army swagger before the U.S. military troop buildup in Baghdad last year.
A resurgence of Madhi Army attacks and opposition could roll back the gains that have allowed Baghdad residents to take cautious steps toward normal life and offered Washington hope of accelerating troop withdrawals.
But recent days have resurrected old challenges.
Al-Sadr's militia forces, estimated at about 60,000, now seem itching for a fight. The current crisis came to head over U.S. and Iraqi raids that have detained hundreds of Mahdi Army loyalists even as the group maintained a shaky cease-fire since August — which the Pentagon has credited for helping bring down violence.
The tensions have spilled over into street battles in Basra between Mahdi fighters and Iraqi government forces. Fighting also has flared in other cities across southern Iraq's Shiite heartland — where Iran is hedging its bets by supporting factions of the Mahdi Army and its main Shiite rival.
Mahdi fighters also are blamed for a series of rocket barrages on the U.S.-protected Green Zone, which was hit again Wednesday. The Pentagon appears to want no part of the current troubles. Commanders worry that American troops could be drawn into difficult urban conflict, sapping energy from the fight against al-Qaida in Iraq and other Sunni insurgents.
U.S. forces have made only sporadic stabs into Sadr City, choosing instead to strengthen a security cordon on the outskirts. U.S. commanders, meanwhile, have a limited presence in southern Iraq and show no signs of diverting soldiers — as they did in the last major fight against the Mahdi Army in 2004.
"We are a different force than the one you saw in 2004," a senior Mahdi commander said at his Sadr City home.
"We are now better organized, have better weapons, command centers and easy access to logistical and financial support," added the commander, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he is not authorized to speak to the media.
Squatting on the floor next to two of his fighters, the commander sipped sweet black tea as a U.S. helicopter flew low overhead. A burst of gunfire rang out at one point. Another moment, he listened to the screech of a rocket.
"That's going to the Green Zone," he said.
When one of his fighters left the house, he warned about driving too close to American patrols on the edge of the district — a grid-pattern of teeming streets in northeast Baghdad built in the 1950s to house poor Shiite workers.
It was first named Revolution City. Then it became Saddam City. After Saddam Hussein's fall in 2003, it was designated Sadr City after al-Sadr's father, Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, whose death is blamed on Saddam agents.
"Don't be too impressed with what the Americans have. We can still win because we have faith and a just cause on our side," said one of the two militiamen in the commander's home.
Sadr City, home to 2.5 million people, looked like a place bracing for battle.
Its streets — normally crowded and noisy — were oddly quiet. Beside the militiamen, only youngsters were out in large numbers, playing soccer on dirt fields. Most stores were shuttered.
The militiamen, some wearing ammunition belts and sporting two-way radios, were out in full force dressed in a ragtag collection of tracksuits, jeans and pajamas. But they carried the essential firepower for effective street conflict: AK-47 rifles or grenade launchers.
Some stood behind rickety market stands with machine guns perched on top. Snipers took up position on rooftops. Others drove in pickup trucks fitted with machine guns.
Many curbs showed traces of disturbed asphalt — usually a telltale sign of freshly planted roadside bombs. Streets were barricaded by rocks, metal furniture or burning tires. Lookouts on motorbikes relayed the latest movements of U.S. armor deployed nearby.
Mahdi Army commanders have told the AP that the militia has recently taken delivery of new weapons supplied by backers in Iran. The arsenal, they said, included roadside bombs, anti-aircraft guns and Soviet-designed Grad rockets.
They also said an infusion of cash, also from Iran, helped the militia set up new command centers equipped with Internet-linked computers, fax machines and satellite mobile phones. They have also received global positioning system devices, they said.
The United States has long accused Iran of providing Shiite militias in Iraq with arms and training. Iran denies it.
Aides to al-Sadr in Baghdad insisted the Mahdi Army cease-fire remained in force, but warned of dire results if Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government continued its crackdown against Mahdi militiamen.
"There will be grave consequences," said Sheik Salman al-Feraiji, al-Sadr's chief representative in Sadr City.
"We are not going to stand by and watch our sons getting killed," he told tribal leaders at a mosque. "You must tell the government that you will disown it if it doesn't stop the operations in the entire south."
Al-Sadr's movement gained ground in Sadr City in the immediate aftermath of Saddam's ouster. It quickly filled the vacuum left by the regime's fall — and Washington's lack of postwar planning — by running basic services and clamping down on looting in a district that had once been notorious for high crime and unemployment.
The militia is not universally popular in Sadr City because some of its men are involved in extortion and kidnapping. But the Mahdi Army is credited by most residents for protecting the district against Sunni militants during the height of Baghdad's sectarian war in 2006 and early 2007.
The bond between Sadr City's residents and the militia was on display Wednesday, with families offering fighters water, tea and food.
"Today, a family sent us rice and meat for lunch," said another militia commander, who identified himself only by the nickname Abu Ali and said he was one of 12 who oversee the Mahdi Army operations in Baghdad and the south.
Al-Sadr's support was instrumental in helping al-Maliki clinch the prime minister's job in 2006, but the two men fell out about a year ago.
"Down with al-Maliki's government," is now common graffiti in Sadr City. "The Dawa party is treasonous," declared another one, referring to al-Maliki's party.
39 minutes ago
BAGHDAD - Shiite militiamen are everywhere. Police and Iraqi army checkpoints are nowhere in sight. U.S. soldiers are keeping their distance.
Sadr City — the Baghdad nerve center for the powerful Mahdi Army — is suddenly back on edge as the militia leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, and Iraq's government lock in a dangerous confrontation over clout and control among the nation's majority Shiites.
The epicenter of the showdown has been the southern oil hub of Basra, where clashes have claimed dozens of lives this week and al-Sadr's forces face a Friday deadline to surrender.
But a more finely tuned measure of the tensions may be found among the one- and two-story homes and shabby storefronts of Sadr City. As the crisis deepened, The Associated Press toured Sadr City on Wednesday to observe its rapid swing from relative quiet to a return of the Mahdi Army swagger before the U.S. military troop buildup in Baghdad last year.
A resurgence of Madhi Army attacks and opposition could roll back the gains that have allowed Baghdad residents to take cautious steps toward normal life and offered Washington hope of accelerating troop withdrawals.
But recent days have resurrected old challenges.
Al-Sadr's militia forces, estimated at about 60,000, now seem itching for a fight. The current crisis came to head over U.S. and Iraqi raids that have detained hundreds of Mahdi Army loyalists even as the group maintained a shaky cease-fire since August — which the Pentagon has credited for helping bring down violence.
The tensions have spilled over into street battles in Basra between Mahdi fighters and Iraqi government forces. Fighting also has flared in other cities across southern Iraq's Shiite heartland — where Iran is hedging its bets by supporting factions of the Mahdi Army and its main Shiite rival.
Mahdi fighters also are blamed for a series of rocket barrages on the U.S.-protected Green Zone, which was hit again Wednesday. The Pentagon appears to want no part of the current troubles. Commanders worry that American troops could be drawn into difficult urban conflict, sapping energy from the fight against al-Qaida in Iraq and other Sunni insurgents.
U.S. forces have made only sporadic stabs into Sadr City, choosing instead to strengthen a security cordon on the outskirts. U.S. commanders, meanwhile, have a limited presence in southern Iraq and show no signs of diverting soldiers — as they did in the last major fight against the Mahdi Army in 2004.
"We are a different force than the one you saw in 2004," a senior Mahdi commander said at his Sadr City home.
"We are now better organized, have better weapons, command centers and easy access to logistical and financial support," added the commander, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he is not authorized to speak to the media.
Squatting on the floor next to two of his fighters, the commander sipped sweet black tea as a U.S. helicopter flew low overhead. A burst of gunfire rang out at one point. Another moment, he listened to the screech of a rocket.
"That's going to the Green Zone," he said.
When one of his fighters left the house, he warned about driving too close to American patrols on the edge of the district — a grid-pattern of teeming streets in northeast Baghdad built in the 1950s to house poor Shiite workers.
It was first named Revolution City. Then it became Saddam City. After Saddam Hussein's fall in 2003, it was designated Sadr City after al-Sadr's father, Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, whose death is blamed on Saddam agents.
"Don't be too impressed with what the Americans have. We can still win because we have faith and a just cause on our side," said one of the two militiamen in the commander's home.
Sadr City, home to 2.5 million people, looked like a place bracing for battle.
Its streets — normally crowded and noisy — were oddly quiet. Beside the militiamen, only youngsters were out in large numbers, playing soccer on dirt fields. Most stores were shuttered.
The militiamen, some wearing ammunition belts and sporting two-way radios, were out in full force dressed in a ragtag collection of tracksuits, jeans and pajamas. But they carried the essential firepower for effective street conflict: AK-47 rifles or grenade launchers.
Some stood behind rickety market stands with machine guns perched on top. Snipers took up position on rooftops. Others drove in pickup trucks fitted with machine guns.
Many curbs showed traces of disturbed asphalt — usually a telltale sign of freshly planted roadside bombs. Streets were barricaded by rocks, metal furniture or burning tires. Lookouts on motorbikes relayed the latest movements of U.S. armor deployed nearby.
Mahdi Army commanders have told the AP that the militia has recently taken delivery of new weapons supplied by backers in Iran. The arsenal, they said, included roadside bombs, anti-aircraft guns and Soviet-designed Grad rockets.
They also said an infusion of cash, also from Iran, helped the militia set up new command centers equipped with Internet-linked computers, fax machines and satellite mobile phones. They have also received global positioning system devices, they said.
The United States has long accused Iran of providing Shiite militias in Iraq with arms and training. Iran denies it.
Aides to al-Sadr in Baghdad insisted the Mahdi Army cease-fire remained in force, but warned of dire results if Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government continued its crackdown against Mahdi militiamen.
"There will be grave consequences," said Sheik Salman al-Feraiji, al-Sadr's chief representative in Sadr City.
"We are not going to stand by and watch our sons getting killed," he told tribal leaders at a mosque. "You must tell the government that you will disown it if it doesn't stop the operations in the entire south."
Al-Sadr's movement gained ground in Sadr City in the immediate aftermath of Saddam's ouster. It quickly filled the vacuum left by the regime's fall — and Washington's lack of postwar planning — by running basic services and clamping down on looting in a district that had once been notorious for high crime and unemployment.
The militia is not universally popular in Sadr City because some of its men are involved in extortion and kidnapping. But the Mahdi Army is credited by most residents for protecting the district against Sunni militants during the height of Baghdad's sectarian war in 2006 and early 2007.
The bond between Sadr City's residents and the militia was on display Wednesday, with families offering fighters water, tea and food.
"Today, a family sent us rice and meat for lunch," said another militia commander, who identified himself only by the nickname Abu Ali and said he was one of 12 who oversee the Mahdi Army operations in Baghdad and the south.
Al-Sadr's support was instrumental in helping al-Maliki clinch the prime minister's job in 2006, but the two men fell out about a year ago.
"Down with al-Maliki's government," is now common graffiti in Sadr City. "The Dawa party is treasonous," declared another one, referring to al-Maliki's party.
The Enigmatic Second Battle of Basra
By Reidar Visser (www.historiae.org)
26 March 2008
On the surface, the story may look plausible enough. A provincial city rich in oil degenerates into mafia-style conditions affecting the security of citizens as well as the national oil revenue; the central government intervenes to clean up. This is how many in the media have been reporting the latest clashes between government forces and militiamen in Basra: the Maliki government has launched a security operation with the single aim of getting rid of unruly militias. Pundits with ties to the Bush administration have added that these are essential “preparations” for this autumn’s provincial elections, or moves to forestall Iranian influence in Basra, or both.
But on closer inspection, there are problems in these accounts. Perhaps most importantly, there is a discrepancy between the description of Basra as a city ruled by militias (in the plural) – which is doubtless correct – and the battlefield facts of the ongoing operations which seem to target only one of these militia groups, the Mahdi Army loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr. Surely, if the aim was to make Basra a safer place, it would have been logical to do something to also stem the influence of the other militias loyal to the local competitors of the Sadrists, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), as well as the armed groups allied to the Fadila party (which have dominated the oil protection services for a long time). But so far, only Sadrists have complained about attacks by government forces.
Others may suggest that rather than having to do with the rule of law, this is part of a wider operation in which Maliki in alliance with ISCI are doing their best to marginalize their political enemies locally – in preparation for local elections in October 2008, or with a view to dominate the process of forming federal entities (which could start next month, in April). Maybe it has been supported by Washington, as compensation for the bitter pill which Dick Cheney brought with him in the shape of a demand for early provincial elections? But whereas that interpretation certainly seemed valid during the first battle of Basra (when Maliki arrived in Basra in late May 2006 and enforced a new security regime that was applauded by ISCI and denounced by Fadila), it does not quite make sense today.
Firstly, if the motive was the provincial elections or the federalism question, the target should have been Fadila and not the Sadrists. Basra is an exceedingly complex city (Shiite factions, Shaykhis, Christians, secularists, Sunnis, tribal groups etc.), and the overall electoral potential of the Sadrists there is probably considerably less than what many analysts have predicted. In the federalism question, the Sadrists are entirely on the sidelines, with the director of the Sadrist office in the city recently complaining that he was being kept in the dark about the project to make Basra a stand-alone federal unit (as propagated by Fadila and some of the secular leaders in the city in a scheme that challenges ISCI’s vision of a single Shiite federal entity).
Secondly, there have been too many recent instances of conflict between Maliki and ISCI on these issues for that interpretation to make perfect sense. Increasingly, Maliki has associated himself with a more centralist current in Iraqi parliamentary politics, sometimes challenging ISCI directly, as seems to have happened during the process of adopting a law for the existing (non-federated) governorates. Whereas ISCI since early 2008 has been more outspoken in its attack on any interference by the central government in local affairs (much on the Kurdish pattern), Maliki has often defended the vision of a reasonably coherent and potent central government. In early March, ISCI demonstrators criticised Maliki’s two security chiefs in Basra, General Mohan al-Firayji and Abd al-Jalil Khalaf, the police commander.
A less obvious explanation that may nevertheless be worth pursuing is Nuri al-Maliki’s attempts to build an independent power base in the security services, to bolster his stature as prime minister (which ISCI repeatedly has attacked), and to compensate for his Daawa party’s lack of strong militias. While the media over the last days have reported disagreements between Maliki and his two top security officials in Basra (and even suggested their imminent dismissal), and despite the fact that top brass commanders from Baghdad are now in charge of operations, it may be more significant that for several weeks, both General Mohan and Khalaf (the police chief) have been talking about a forthcoming crackdown on militias (and on some occasions have singled out the Sadrists for criticism.) Prior to the current manoeuvres (codenamed “the attack of the knights” or sawlat al-fursan) there were more limited operations against Mahdist followers of Ahmad al-Hasan in Basra back in January. Success in this kind of moves against internal Shiite enemies could conceivably make Maliki more immune against challenges to his premiership from ISCI (and also an attractive partner in other governorates where the Sadrists are a more formidable challenge), but it does not resolve the contradiction between his own centralism (where the Sadrists would be a logical partner) and the decentralism of ISCI. Also, the conciliatory statements by several Sadrist parliamentarians and directors of the provincial Sadrist offices in the first part of 2008 suggested that many of them would prefer politics to battlefield; it seems like a miscalculation by Maliki to spurn these overtures.
Still, there are probably few spots on this planet where the search for mono-causality is more futile than Basra. One key player that has so far refrained from showing its hand is Fadila, which controls the governor position. Back in 2007 the party frequently criticised Maliki’s security operatives in Basra, at one point even signalling reluctance to the prospect of a handover from the British to the Iraqi forces. (The party may have feared that Maliki’s attempt to oust them from positions of power locally – an attempt that was also supported by ISCI – would come to fruition as soon as the British forces were gone.) But then, after the December 2007 handover to Iraqi control and a subsequent “pact” between Basra’s main political parties, the surface of local politics turned remarkably calm for a while. In January 2008, Fadila publicly supported the crackdown on the Mahdists, but the party has made no statement yet on the recent operations (although it is reported that the Basra governor, Muhammad al-Waili, has recently met with Maliki).
Perhaps the most useful approach is to compare the narratives of the parties involved. Maliki says this is a clampdown on illegal militias involved in “oil smuggling”. ISCI also highlights oil smuggling and expresses support for “the state”. The British and the Americans seem to agree with this (even if it is truly risky to engage in this sort of thing on the eve of the Petraeus/Crocker hearings next month). The Sadrists complain about highhandedness by a government allied to “the occupation”. This could all suggest that Maliki and ISCI – fundamental ideological tensions notwithstanding – have temporarily agreed to disagree about the question of federalism and instead resolved that the Sadrists are their common enemy. But until Fadila speaks, we will not know the true significance of the second battle of Basra, what the implications are for the local balance of power, and what this in turn means in terms of the impact on the federalism issue and the question of Iranian influence.
--------------------
The Fadila Party Criticises the Basra Operations
By Reidar Visser (www.historiae.org) 27 March 2008
[Postscript to yesterday’s article, The Enigmatic Second Battle of Basra, at www.historiae.org/sawlah.asp ]
After a long silence on the Basra operations, the parliamentary bloc of the Fadila party has within the past hours released a statement criticising the impact on civilian life in Basra and asking for an end to the operations “as soon as possible”. This is not quite as hostile as the reactions by the Sadrists, but it underscores internal Shiite divisions regarding control of Basra and shows how little room for manoeuvre Nuri al-Maliki really has. His remaining allies are ISCI, Daawa and the independent Shiites, but neither he nor the independents share ISCI’s preference for a weak central government. Unless Maliki is able to secure defections from ISCI (or a change of their policy in the federalism question) this seems to be a poor basis on which to build a coalition.
--------------------
Maliki, Hakim, and Iran’s Role in the Basra Fighting
By Reidar Visser (www.historiae.org)
9 April 2008
One week after the upsurge of violence in Basra, questions about the motives and the implications of the fighting still linger. The issue of Iran’s involvement remains especially obscure.
A recurrent explanation suggests that the operations were an attempt by Nuri al-Maliki and Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim to weaken the Sadrists ahead of October’s provincial elections, and perhaps to also further Hakim’s scheme of a single Shiite federal entity, which many Sadrists have resisted. On the surface this seems plausible. This has clearly been a political operation and not a purely security-guided one: Many militia forces in Basra unaffiliated with the Sadrists were left untouched. Also, the Maliki-Hakim axis is the sole remnant of the United Iraqi Alliance; to its backers it would be prudent to stick together and guard against encroachments on their local power bases. As for the United States, as long as it policy remains tied to Hakim’s Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) it can perhaps make sense to give the green light to operations against the Sadrists, even if the timing (on the eve of the Crocker/Petraeus hearings) and the scale of the attack (after one year of trying to differentiate between “moderate” and “hardliner” Sadrists) may not have been of its choosing.
However, the theory of a stable Maliki-Hakim alliance overlooks disagreement between the two on key issues. Crucially, Maliki disagrees with ISCI on federalism, both with regard to the South of Baghdad Region (the proposed nine-governorate Shiite federal entity), and with respect to federalism as a more general principle of government. In an interview in late 2007, Maliki said: “There are two schools on federalism, the first moving in the direction of making the central state extremely weak, no more than a mere instrument for delivering funds and distributing them. Another school moves in the direction of federalism with a strong state capable of controlling the situation. It is this kind of federalism that we in the Daawa support.” Of course, that “first school” – which Maliki went on to criticise as potentially harmful to the unity of Iraq – corresponds perfectly to ISCI’s official policy. ISCI’s recent attempt at reducing as much as possible Baghdad’s power in the non-federated governorates act is the exact antithesis to Maliki’s line.
Once the existence of this kind of friction is acknowledged, it becomes possible to identify additional weaknesses in the theory of a carefully synchronised Hakim-Maliki effort. Among them is the assumption that the Iraqi military and police have already been completely infiltrated by ISCI and that every battle fought between government forces and Shiite discontents over the past year has been initiated at the behest of Hakim. True, ISCI has obtained significant fiefdoms in the security forces. But the party is not omnipotent. For example, ISCI recently complained angrily that the police in Nasiriyya – which has an ISCI governor – were becoming “politicised”, i.e. populated by individuals critical of ISCI. Similarly, the interior ministry long resisted attempts by ISCI to sack a police commander in Hilla whose staunch anti-militia policies ISCI leaders took exception to (the commander was eventually assassinated in December 2007). And in early March, Maliki’s chief of security in Basra, General Mohan al-Firayji, faced angry demonstrators who demanded his resignation; these protestors were mostly ISCI supporters .
The demonstrations against General Mohan can offer insights about Iran’s role. Alongside ISCI, another key participant was Daghir al-Musawi, leader of the small Sayyid al-Shuhada movement. Musawi’s critics have long accused him of close ties to the leadership of the Iranian revolutionary guards. It is noteworthy that precisely in this context, Maliki’s man, General Mohan, complained about “Iranian influence” in Basra. Similarly, as part of the Basra operations, Iraqi forces targeted the pro-Iranian Tharallah militia and arrested its leader. This less known casualty of the Basra fighting has been a loyal ally of ISCI in its campaign to unseat the Basra governor, Muhammad al-Waili of the anti-Iranian Fadila party. In 2006, black-clad members of Tharallah paraded through Basra identifying themselves as the “Martyr Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim Squadron”, a reference to the previous leader of ISCI. Among the groups singled out by Ambassador Ryan Crocker for criticism in the 8 April US Senate hearings on Iraq was “Hizbollah in Iraq”, another stalwart ally of ISCI.
In sum, it appears that Iran may have made an input on both sides during the Basra showdown. The smaller pro-Iranian parties within ISCI’s umbrella organization put pressure on Maliki and may have nudged him towards taking stronger action against the Sadrists than originally contemplated. But the conclusion of a ceasefire on Iranian soil shows that Tehran’s ability to influence the other end of the spectrum – the traditionally Iraqi nationalist Sadrist movement – may now be stronger than ever before, quite possibly the result of Muqtada’s relocation to Iran at the beginning of “the surge”, when he may have felt cornered by US policy.
To the US, the good news is that Maliki still seems to insist on a certain independence vis-à-vis ISCI and Iran. A look at the composition of Maliki’s entourage during his previous mission to Basra when he imposed emergency rule in May 2006 suggests that his power base is evolving. Then he arrived with the chief of the ISCI-linked Badr Organization, Hadi al-Amiri, as well as a former Sadrist minister from Basra, Salam al-Maliki. This time his aides consisted of independents, interior ministry staff, and Shirwan al-Waili of the Tanzim al-Iraq branch of the Daawa. The constant in all of this seems to be Maliki’s desire to come across as a strong leader: In 2006, he promised an “iron fist”; this time he announced “the assault of the knights”. Through the process, he may well have rediscovered the usefulness of siding with ISCI, but there is nothing to suggest that Maliki acted as he did for the sake of the nine-governorate Shiite federal entity.
The bad news is that Maliki’s current survival strategy does not appear to be compatible with the declared US objective of achieving national reconciliation in Iraq. Maliki’s vision of national reconciliation seems largely theatrical and not focused on profound constitutional revision. So far, it has failed to appeal beyond the small ruling minority of the Sunni Tawafuq bloc, the Kurds, and the Shiite ISCI – of whom the two latter also disagree deeply with Maliki on federalism. Conversely, Maliki’s view of the Sadrists is altogether unrealistic. The Sadrists are far too deep-rooted in Iraqi society to be ignored; ideologically both they and the Fadila (which similarly criticised the Basra operations) are an important part of the centre in Iraqi politics that Maliki is seeking. All too often it is forgotten that the benchmark of a fixed date for local elections was met mainly due to pressure from the Sadrists and Fadila in alliance with Sunnis and secularists, the very forces that are consistently being sidelined by Maliki and the United States.
Finally, there is Maliki’s continued reliance on the support of the breakaway Hizb al-Daawa (Tanzim al-Iraq). Having been set afloat by Iran in 2002 (rather than being a product of the Iraqi underground, as is sometimes claimed) this chameleon-like outfit may well have as its principal objective to create as much confusion in Shiite Iraqi politics as possible. The party was probably designed as a counterweight to the mainline Daawa movement which always maintained a certain distance to Iran; whereas it supported ISCI’s ideas about a single Shiite federal region back in 2006 it has gradually reverted to an Iraqi nationalist rhetoric, raising yet more questions about its own loyalties and aims.
To the US, the best way of rectifying these problems would be to abandon the current policy of unquestioningly going after whomever Maliki defines as a terrorist. Instead Washington could emulate the Iranians: talk to as many Shiite factions as possible, which could be done simply by supporting free and fair local elections in October without giving in to very predictable schemes by Maliki and ISCI to exclude or obstruct the Sadrists and other undesirable competitors. Unfortunately, however, Washington appears headed in a different direction. The Bush administration fails to acknowledge that Iranian influences in Iraq operate through several channels, including some of Washington's best friends. In reality, the Iraqi nationalist component of Maliki’s government is wafer-thin, and unless this problem at the Green-Zone level is addressed and anti-Iranian currents among the Shiites are better represented, no amount of bottom-up progress, “breathing room” or American material support in the provinces will be sufficient to achieve national reconciliation.
In sum, the Iraqi system is locked at the top level. The artificial constellation of the so-called “moderate coalition” under Maliki is to a large extent the result of a weaponry-focused American misreading of the many channels of Iranian influence. This was best summed up by Ryan Crocker’s comments in the US Senate on 8 April: in an attempt at playing down the significance of Mahmud Amadinejad’s popularity in Iraqi government circles, Crocker referred to the staunch anti-Iranian attitude of the Iraqi Shiites during the Iran-Iraq War. What Crocker failed to mention was that his own administration’s main Shiite partner in Iraq is the only sizeable Shiite party that fought on the Iranian side. Moreover, the confusion about the relationship between Iraqi Shiites and Iran is equally widespread on the Democratic side. Top Democrats are among the foremost proponents of the view that strong Iranian influence is a perfectly natural aspect of Iraqi politics and entirely unrelated to US policy decisions, and that it cannot possibly be reversed. This kind of defeatism is an affront to those nationalist Iraqi Shiites who fought against Iran in the 1980s and whose marginalization is the result of US policy decisions rather than of internal Iraqi dynamics. Nonetheless, it is a view shared by everyone who limits the discussion of Iranian influence to arms traffic and “special groups” and refuses to consider the Iranian influence in Green-Zone politics – in other words, it has the backing of General Petraeus and Barack Obama alike.
26 March 2008
On the surface, the story may look plausible enough. A provincial city rich in oil degenerates into mafia-style conditions affecting the security of citizens as well as the national oil revenue; the central government intervenes to clean up. This is how many in the media have been reporting the latest clashes between government forces and militiamen in Basra: the Maliki government has launched a security operation with the single aim of getting rid of unruly militias. Pundits with ties to the Bush administration have added that these are essential “preparations” for this autumn’s provincial elections, or moves to forestall Iranian influence in Basra, or both.
But on closer inspection, there are problems in these accounts. Perhaps most importantly, there is a discrepancy between the description of Basra as a city ruled by militias (in the plural) – which is doubtless correct – and the battlefield facts of the ongoing operations which seem to target only one of these militia groups, the Mahdi Army loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr. Surely, if the aim was to make Basra a safer place, it would have been logical to do something to also stem the influence of the other militias loyal to the local competitors of the Sadrists, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), as well as the armed groups allied to the Fadila party (which have dominated the oil protection services for a long time). But so far, only Sadrists have complained about attacks by government forces.
Others may suggest that rather than having to do with the rule of law, this is part of a wider operation in which Maliki in alliance with ISCI are doing their best to marginalize their political enemies locally – in preparation for local elections in October 2008, or with a view to dominate the process of forming federal entities (which could start next month, in April). Maybe it has been supported by Washington, as compensation for the bitter pill which Dick Cheney brought with him in the shape of a demand for early provincial elections? But whereas that interpretation certainly seemed valid during the first battle of Basra (when Maliki arrived in Basra in late May 2006 and enforced a new security regime that was applauded by ISCI and denounced by Fadila), it does not quite make sense today.
Firstly, if the motive was the provincial elections or the federalism question, the target should have been Fadila and not the Sadrists. Basra is an exceedingly complex city (Shiite factions, Shaykhis, Christians, secularists, Sunnis, tribal groups etc.), and the overall electoral potential of the Sadrists there is probably considerably less than what many analysts have predicted. In the federalism question, the Sadrists are entirely on the sidelines, with the director of the Sadrist office in the city recently complaining that he was being kept in the dark about the project to make Basra a stand-alone federal unit (as propagated by Fadila and some of the secular leaders in the city in a scheme that challenges ISCI’s vision of a single Shiite federal entity).
Secondly, there have been too many recent instances of conflict between Maliki and ISCI on these issues for that interpretation to make perfect sense. Increasingly, Maliki has associated himself with a more centralist current in Iraqi parliamentary politics, sometimes challenging ISCI directly, as seems to have happened during the process of adopting a law for the existing (non-federated) governorates. Whereas ISCI since early 2008 has been more outspoken in its attack on any interference by the central government in local affairs (much on the Kurdish pattern), Maliki has often defended the vision of a reasonably coherent and potent central government. In early March, ISCI demonstrators criticised Maliki’s two security chiefs in Basra, General Mohan al-Firayji and Abd al-Jalil Khalaf, the police commander.
A less obvious explanation that may nevertheless be worth pursuing is Nuri al-Maliki’s attempts to build an independent power base in the security services, to bolster his stature as prime minister (which ISCI repeatedly has attacked), and to compensate for his Daawa party’s lack of strong militias. While the media over the last days have reported disagreements between Maliki and his two top security officials in Basra (and even suggested their imminent dismissal), and despite the fact that top brass commanders from Baghdad are now in charge of operations, it may be more significant that for several weeks, both General Mohan and Khalaf (the police chief) have been talking about a forthcoming crackdown on militias (and on some occasions have singled out the Sadrists for criticism.) Prior to the current manoeuvres (codenamed “the attack of the knights” or sawlat al-fursan) there were more limited operations against Mahdist followers of Ahmad al-Hasan in Basra back in January. Success in this kind of moves against internal Shiite enemies could conceivably make Maliki more immune against challenges to his premiership from ISCI (and also an attractive partner in other governorates where the Sadrists are a more formidable challenge), but it does not resolve the contradiction between his own centralism (where the Sadrists would be a logical partner) and the decentralism of ISCI. Also, the conciliatory statements by several Sadrist parliamentarians and directors of the provincial Sadrist offices in the first part of 2008 suggested that many of them would prefer politics to battlefield; it seems like a miscalculation by Maliki to spurn these overtures.
Still, there are probably few spots on this planet where the search for mono-causality is more futile than Basra. One key player that has so far refrained from showing its hand is Fadila, which controls the governor position. Back in 2007 the party frequently criticised Maliki’s security operatives in Basra, at one point even signalling reluctance to the prospect of a handover from the British to the Iraqi forces. (The party may have feared that Maliki’s attempt to oust them from positions of power locally – an attempt that was also supported by ISCI – would come to fruition as soon as the British forces were gone.) But then, after the December 2007 handover to Iraqi control and a subsequent “pact” between Basra’s main political parties, the surface of local politics turned remarkably calm for a while. In January 2008, Fadila publicly supported the crackdown on the Mahdists, but the party has made no statement yet on the recent operations (although it is reported that the Basra governor, Muhammad al-Waili, has recently met with Maliki).
Perhaps the most useful approach is to compare the narratives of the parties involved. Maliki says this is a clampdown on illegal militias involved in “oil smuggling”. ISCI also highlights oil smuggling and expresses support for “the state”. The British and the Americans seem to agree with this (even if it is truly risky to engage in this sort of thing on the eve of the Petraeus/Crocker hearings next month). The Sadrists complain about highhandedness by a government allied to “the occupation”. This could all suggest that Maliki and ISCI – fundamental ideological tensions notwithstanding – have temporarily agreed to disagree about the question of federalism and instead resolved that the Sadrists are their common enemy. But until Fadila speaks, we will not know the true significance of the second battle of Basra, what the implications are for the local balance of power, and what this in turn means in terms of the impact on the federalism issue and the question of Iranian influence.
--------------------
The Fadila Party Criticises the Basra Operations
By Reidar Visser (www.historiae.org) 27 March 2008
[Postscript to yesterday’s article, The Enigmatic Second Battle of Basra, at www.historiae.org/sawlah.asp ]
After a long silence on the Basra operations, the parliamentary bloc of the Fadila party has within the past hours released a statement criticising the impact on civilian life in Basra and asking for an end to the operations “as soon as possible”. This is not quite as hostile as the reactions by the Sadrists, but it underscores internal Shiite divisions regarding control of Basra and shows how little room for manoeuvre Nuri al-Maliki really has. His remaining allies are ISCI, Daawa and the independent Shiites, but neither he nor the independents share ISCI’s preference for a weak central government. Unless Maliki is able to secure defections from ISCI (or a change of their policy in the federalism question) this seems to be a poor basis on which to build a coalition.
--------------------
Maliki, Hakim, and Iran’s Role in the Basra Fighting
By Reidar Visser (www.historiae.org)
9 April 2008
One week after the upsurge of violence in Basra, questions about the motives and the implications of the fighting still linger. The issue of Iran’s involvement remains especially obscure.
A recurrent explanation suggests that the operations were an attempt by Nuri al-Maliki and Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim to weaken the Sadrists ahead of October’s provincial elections, and perhaps to also further Hakim’s scheme of a single Shiite federal entity, which many Sadrists have resisted. On the surface this seems plausible. This has clearly been a political operation and not a purely security-guided one: Many militia forces in Basra unaffiliated with the Sadrists were left untouched. Also, the Maliki-Hakim axis is the sole remnant of the United Iraqi Alliance; to its backers it would be prudent to stick together and guard against encroachments on their local power bases. As for the United States, as long as it policy remains tied to Hakim’s Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) it can perhaps make sense to give the green light to operations against the Sadrists, even if the timing (on the eve of the Crocker/Petraeus hearings) and the scale of the attack (after one year of trying to differentiate between “moderate” and “hardliner” Sadrists) may not have been of its choosing.
However, the theory of a stable Maliki-Hakim alliance overlooks disagreement between the two on key issues. Crucially, Maliki disagrees with ISCI on federalism, both with regard to the South of Baghdad Region (the proposed nine-governorate Shiite federal entity), and with respect to federalism as a more general principle of government. In an interview in late 2007, Maliki said: “There are two schools on federalism, the first moving in the direction of making the central state extremely weak, no more than a mere instrument for delivering funds and distributing them. Another school moves in the direction of federalism with a strong state capable of controlling the situation. It is this kind of federalism that we in the Daawa support.” Of course, that “first school” – which Maliki went on to criticise as potentially harmful to the unity of Iraq – corresponds perfectly to ISCI’s official policy. ISCI’s recent attempt at reducing as much as possible Baghdad’s power in the non-federated governorates act is the exact antithesis to Maliki’s line.
Once the existence of this kind of friction is acknowledged, it becomes possible to identify additional weaknesses in the theory of a carefully synchronised Hakim-Maliki effort. Among them is the assumption that the Iraqi military and police have already been completely infiltrated by ISCI and that every battle fought between government forces and Shiite discontents over the past year has been initiated at the behest of Hakim. True, ISCI has obtained significant fiefdoms in the security forces. But the party is not omnipotent. For example, ISCI recently complained angrily that the police in Nasiriyya – which has an ISCI governor – were becoming “politicised”, i.e. populated by individuals critical of ISCI. Similarly, the interior ministry long resisted attempts by ISCI to sack a police commander in Hilla whose staunch anti-militia policies ISCI leaders took exception to (the commander was eventually assassinated in December 2007). And in early March, Maliki’s chief of security in Basra, General Mohan al-Firayji, faced angry demonstrators who demanded his resignation; these protestors were mostly ISCI supporters .
The demonstrations against General Mohan can offer insights about Iran’s role. Alongside ISCI, another key participant was Daghir al-Musawi, leader of the small Sayyid al-Shuhada movement. Musawi’s critics have long accused him of close ties to the leadership of the Iranian revolutionary guards. It is noteworthy that precisely in this context, Maliki’s man, General Mohan, complained about “Iranian influence” in Basra. Similarly, as part of the Basra operations, Iraqi forces targeted the pro-Iranian Tharallah militia and arrested its leader. This less known casualty of the Basra fighting has been a loyal ally of ISCI in its campaign to unseat the Basra governor, Muhammad al-Waili of the anti-Iranian Fadila party. In 2006, black-clad members of Tharallah paraded through Basra identifying themselves as the “Martyr Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim Squadron”, a reference to the previous leader of ISCI. Among the groups singled out by Ambassador Ryan Crocker for criticism in the 8 April US Senate hearings on Iraq was “Hizbollah in Iraq”, another stalwart ally of ISCI.
In sum, it appears that Iran may have made an input on both sides during the Basra showdown. The smaller pro-Iranian parties within ISCI’s umbrella organization put pressure on Maliki and may have nudged him towards taking stronger action against the Sadrists than originally contemplated. But the conclusion of a ceasefire on Iranian soil shows that Tehran’s ability to influence the other end of the spectrum – the traditionally Iraqi nationalist Sadrist movement – may now be stronger than ever before, quite possibly the result of Muqtada’s relocation to Iran at the beginning of “the surge”, when he may have felt cornered by US policy.
To the US, the good news is that Maliki still seems to insist on a certain independence vis-à-vis ISCI and Iran. A look at the composition of Maliki’s entourage during his previous mission to Basra when he imposed emergency rule in May 2006 suggests that his power base is evolving. Then he arrived with the chief of the ISCI-linked Badr Organization, Hadi al-Amiri, as well as a former Sadrist minister from Basra, Salam al-Maliki. This time his aides consisted of independents, interior ministry staff, and Shirwan al-Waili of the Tanzim al-Iraq branch of the Daawa. The constant in all of this seems to be Maliki’s desire to come across as a strong leader: In 2006, he promised an “iron fist”; this time he announced “the assault of the knights”. Through the process, he may well have rediscovered the usefulness of siding with ISCI, but there is nothing to suggest that Maliki acted as he did for the sake of the nine-governorate Shiite federal entity.
The bad news is that Maliki’s current survival strategy does not appear to be compatible with the declared US objective of achieving national reconciliation in Iraq. Maliki’s vision of national reconciliation seems largely theatrical and not focused on profound constitutional revision. So far, it has failed to appeal beyond the small ruling minority of the Sunni Tawafuq bloc, the Kurds, and the Shiite ISCI – of whom the two latter also disagree deeply with Maliki on federalism. Conversely, Maliki’s view of the Sadrists is altogether unrealistic. The Sadrists are far too deep-rooted in Iraqi society to be ignored; ideologically both they and the Fadila (which similarly criticised the Basra operations) are an important part of the centre in Iraqi politics that Maliki is seeking. All too often it is forgotten that the benchmark of a fixed date for local elections was met mainly due to pressure from the Sadrists and Fadila in alliance with Sunnis and secularists, the very forces that are consistently being sidelined by Maliki and the United States.
Finally, there is Maliki’s continued reliance on the support of the breakaway Hizb al-Daawa (Tanzim al-Iraq). Having been set afloat by Iran in 2002 (rather than being a product of the Iraqi underground, as is sometimes claimed) this chameleon-like outfit may well have as its principal objective to create as much confusion in Shiite Iraqi politics as possible. The party was probably designed as a counterweight to the mainline Daawa movement which always maintained a certain distance to Iran; whereas it supported ISCI’s ideas about a single Shiite federal region back in 2006 it has gradually reverted to an Iraqi nationalist rhetoric, raising yet more questions about its own loyalties and aims.
To the US, the best way of rectifying these problems would be to abandon the current policy of unquestioningly going after whomever Maliki defines as a terrorist. Instead Washington could emulate the Iranians: talk to as many Shiite factions as possible, which could be done simply by supporting free and fair local elections in October without giving in to very predictable schemes by Maliki and ISCI to exclude or obstruct the Sadrists and other undesirable competitors. Unfortunately, however, Washington appears headed in a different direction. The Bush administration fails to acknowledge that Iranian influences in Iraq operate through several channels, including some of Washington's best friends. In reality, the Iraqi nationalist component of Maliki’s government is wafer-thin, and unless this problem at the Green-Zone level is addressed and anti-Iranian currents among the Shiites are better represented, no amount of bottom-up progress, “breathing room” or American material support in the provinces will be sufficient to achieve national reconciliation.
In sum, the Iraqi system is locked at the top level. The artificial constellation of the so-called “moderate coalition” under Maliki is to a large extent the result of a weaponry-focused American misreading of the many channels of Iranian influence. This was best summed up by Ryan Crocker’s comments in the US Senate on 8 April: in an attempt at playing down the significance of Mahmud Amadinejad’s popularity in Iraqi government circles, Crocker referred to the staunch anti-Iranian attitude of the Iraqi Shiites during the Iran-Iraq War. What Crocker failed to mention was that his own administration’s main Shiite partner in Iraq is the only sizeable Shiite party that fought on the Iranian side. Moreover, the confusion about the relationship between Iraqi Shiites and Iran is equally widespread on the Democratic side. Top Democrats are among the foremost proponents of the view that strong Iranian influence is a perfectly natural aspect of Iraqi politics and entirely unrelated to US policy decisions, and that it cannot possibly be reversed. This kind of defeatism is an affront to those nationalist Iraqi Shiites who fought against Iran in the 1980s and whose marginalization is the result of US policy decisions rather than of internal Iraqi dynamics. Nonetheless, it is a view shared by everyone who limits the discussion of Iranian influence to arms traffic and “special groups” and refuses to consider the Iranian influence in Green-Zone politics – in other words, it has the backing of General Petraeus and Barack Obama alike.
Basra Battle-2nd Day
Iraq forces, militants clash in oil city
26 Mar 2008 07:36:00 GMT
Source: Reuters
By Aref Mohammed
BASRA, Iraq, March 26 (Reuters) - Militants loyal to Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr clashed with Iraqi security forces throughout Iraq's southern oil hub of Basra for a second day on Wednesday.
A health official said 40 people had been killed and 200 wounded in the first day of the clashes, including civilians, gunmen and Iraqi security forces.
Police said heavy gunbattles between the two sides restarted early Wednesday in five districts of the city after a brief lull, as the Iraqi military continued its operation to clear the city of armed gunmen.
Mortar or rocket attacks struck Iraqi security forces checkpoints and bases regularly.
Many towns and cities across southern Iraq were under a night-time curfew as authorities sought to prevent further outbreaks of violence.
Ground commander Major-General Ali Zaidan told Reuters his forces had killed more than 30 militants on the first day of the operation, which began before dawn on Tuesday. More than 25 were wounded and around 50 were captured, he said.
"The operation is still going on and will not stop until it achieves its objectives," he said. "It is on the same scale as yesterday."
Police said a roadside bomb exploded near a car in northern Basra early on Wednesday killing all of the passengers.
"Now there is heavy gunfire and I have heard the sounds of explosions. I also saw a group of gunmen planting roadside bombs," said Abbas, a Basra resident who would only give his first name.
In Baghdad there have also been clashes in Sadr city, a poor, crowded area that is a major base of support for Sadr's followers.
A source at Sadr City's Imam Ali hospital said four bodies and 25 wounded arrived overnight.
U.S. military spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Steven Stover said two members of the Iraqi security forces were killed in an attack on a checkpoint in Sadr City late on Tuesday.
U.S. forces reinforced the checkpoint. A U.S. Stryker armoured vehicle was also destroyed by a roadside bomb in Sadr City, and there were several rocket attacks in the area overnight, he said.
The clashes have threatened a ceasefire Sadr imposed on his Mehdi Army militia last August.
Sadr, an influential leader who has not been seen in public for months, issued a statement calling on Iraqis to stage sit-ins all over Iraq and said he would declare "civil revolt" if attacks by U.S. and Iraqi forces continued.
Streets in Basra were largely empty except for Iraqi security forces, and shops remained closed. At least four Iraqi helicopters could be seen hovering over the city.
"The situation is so tense. I did not go to work today. Nobody is going to work," said Kareem, a Basra resident who would only give his first name. "There are gunmen at every intersection."
An official with Iraq's Southern Oil Company said fighting had not affected Basra's oil output or exports, which provide the vast majority of government revenues.
"The work of the oil companies concerning production and exports continue as normal because the military operations are taking place far away," he said. (Writing by Randy Fabi; Editing by Dominic Evans)
-------------
14 killed, 140 wounded in Baghdad's Sadr City
DEATH TO MALIKI DEATH TO UNITED SHAITANIC STATES
I don't think so Ayatollah will be happy inside his peaceful home of Najaf
26 Mar 2008 07:56:15 GMT
Source: Reuters
(Adds Bustan quote)
BAGHDAD, March 26 (Reuters) - Fourteen people were killed and more than 140 wounded in clashes between security forces and Shi'ite militants in Baghdad's Sadr City slum, a medical source said on Wednesday.
The source in the health office for the eastern half of Baghdad said the figures came from the Sadr and Imam Ali hospitals in Sadr City and the Kindi hospital in central Baghdad.
He said the casualties included women and children caught in the crossfire in the clashes, which broke out on Tuesday and continued overnight.
Ali Bustan, general director of the health office, said at least 8 people had been killed and 70 wounded.
"We have a shortage of doctors because the American troops are not letting them into Sadr City," he told Reuters. (Reporting by Aseel Kami; writing by Peter Graff; editing by Ross Colvin)
--------------
By Sholnn Freeman and Sudarsan RaghavanWashington Post Foreign Service
Wednesday, March 26, 2008; Page A01
It was unclear why U.S. forces would take part in a broad armed challenge to Sadr and his thousands-strong militia on the eve of Petraeus's assessment, which the Bush administration has said would greatly influence its decision on whether to draw down troop levels.
But many Sadr followers view the offensive as the latest attempt by the United States and Sadr's Shiite rivals, who run Iraq's government, to take advantage of Sadr's cease-fire to weaken his movement politically ahead of provincial elections that could take place this year.
"We are really scared," said Aahad Hamid, 27, a Basra University employee whose voice quivered on the phone as Iraqi attack helicopters flew over the city. "We can hear the voice of the bullets."
In a sign of the offensive's importance, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki flew to Basra on Monday to oversee operations.
In addition to resisting with arms, Sadr's movement led a labor strike for a second day in many parts of eastern and central Baghdad on Tuesday, demanding the release of Sadr's jailed followers and an end to Iraqi government raids. Sadrist leaders ordered stores to close and taxi and bus drivers to stop operations. Many neighborhoods turned into virtual ghost towns, their usually busy streets all but empty. Parents kept their children home from school.
Sadr, who imposed the cease-fire to improve his nationalist credentials and rein in his often unruly militia, is under immense pressure from senior loyalists to lift the cease-fire order. Two weeks ago, he issued a statement permitting the Mahdi Army to fire on U.S. and Iraqi forces in self-defense. Hazim al-Araji, a senior Sadr official in the southern holy city of Najaf, told reporters there that the cease-fire remains in place despite Tuesday's clashes.
------
Later, hundreds of Sadr followers took to the streets of Najaf, carrying Korans, Iraqi flags and olive branches. Calling Maliki "the agent of Americans," they chanted: "No, no occupation! No, no terrorism!"
"The Iraqi army went to Basra under the pretext of imposing a security plan, but the fact is they are targeting Sadrists," said Haidar al-Jaberi, a Sadr official who joined the protest.
Violence has gripped Basra since December, when British troops handed over control of the province to the Iraqi government. A power struggle between the Mahdi Army and its main rival, the Badr Organization militia of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, has battered the city in recent months. Smaller Shiite militias are also taking part in the fighting.
Ahead of the offensive, the Iraqi government closed off land access to the city and imposed a nighttime curfew until further notice. The government ordered schools, institutes and universities to cancel classes from Tuesday through Thursday. Some residents said they had no time to stock up on food and clean water.
Residents also reported that sporadic clashes began in Basra early Tuesday morning in the neighborhoods of Hayania, Jubaila and Jumhuria, all known Sadr strongholds. In telephone interviews, they described seeing military vehicles, soldiers and policemen exchanging fire with gunmen. Television footage showed militiamen firing rocket-propelled grenades at Iraqi security forces; others attacked from rooftops with AK-47 assault rifles, machine guns and mortars.
"No one is on the street," said Mohammed Kadhim, who owns a clothing shop in the city center. As he spoke, gunfire could be heard in the background. "I am not able to go out of my house."
Kadhim added that one of his neighbors had been shot in the face and was in critical condition.
"It's a tough and difficult battle," he said, adding that his men were fighting Mahdi Army militias, criminal gangs and death squads.
The adviser, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to reporters, said he expected the campaign to take a week to 10 days. "No state can have two armies. It is either the Iraqi military or the Mahdi Army," he said.
Col. Bill Buckner, a U.S. military spokesman, said coalition forces were providing intelligence, surveillance and support aircraft. Maj. Tom Holloway, a British military spokesman, said British forces were standing by but were not involved in the crackdown. He also said the British and Americans were providing surveillance support from aircraft.
As the offensive progressed, violence broke out elsewhere in the country. In Baghdad's al-Amin neighborhood, Mahdi Army gunmen stormed two offices of the Dawa party, which Maliki heads, and clashed with guards there. Five Mahdi Army gunmen and two Dawa guards were killed, an Interior Ministry official said.
In Sadr City on Tuesday afternoon, Mahdi Army militiamen were manning checkpoints and directing traffic. The main police station was empty.
Abu Ali al-Fartousi, a Mahdi Army fighter, said a battle broke out in Sadr City at 10:30 p.m., with Mahdi fighters using machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades to repel government forces. A U.S. military spokesman reported no word on any late-night fighting in Sadr City.
Lt. Col. Steven Stover, a U.S. military spokesman, said U.S. troops backed Iraqi security forces as they engaged with "special groups criminal elements outside of Sadr City." A U.S. soldier was killed about 5 p.m. in an attack near Baghdad's Adhamiyah district, the U.S. military said. He was not identified.
Special correspondents Zaid Sabah, Naseer Nouri, Dalya Hassan and K.I. Ibrahim in Baghdad, Saad Sarhan in Najaf, and Washington Post staff in Nasiriyah contributed to this report.
26 Mar 2008 07:36:00 GMT
Source: Reuters
By Aref Mohammed
BASRA, Iraq, March 26 (Reuters) - Militants loyal to Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr clashed with Iraqi security forces throughout Iraq's southern oil hub of Basra for a second day on Wednesday.
A health official said 40 people had been killed and 200 wounded in the first day of the clashes, including civilians, gunmen and Iraqi security forces.
Police said heavy gunbattles between the two sides restarted early Wednesday in five districts of the city after a brief lull, as the Iraqi military continued its operation to clear the city of armed gunmen.
Mortar or rocket attacks struck Iraqi security forces checkpoints and bases regularly.
Many towns and cities across southern Iraq were under a night-time curfew as authorities sought to prevent further outbreaks of violence.
Ground commander Major-General Ali Zaidan told Reuters his forces had killed more than 30 militants on the first day of the operation, which began before dawn on Tuesday. More than 25 were wounded and around 50 were captured, he said.
"The operation is still going on and will not stop until it achieves its objectives," he said. "It is on the same scale as yesterday."
Police said a roadside bomb exploded near a car in northern Basra early on Wednesday killing all of the passengers.
"Now there is heavy gunfire and I have heard the sounds of explosions. I also saw a group of gunmen planting roadside bombs," said Abbas, a Basra resident who would only give his first name.
In Baghdad there have also been clashes in Sadr city, a poor, crowded area that is a major base of support for Sadr's followers.
A source at Sadr City's Imam Ali hospital said four bodies and 25 wounded arrived overnight.
U.S. military spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Steven Stover said two members of the Iraqi security forces were killed in an attack on a checkpoint in Sadr City late on Tuesday.
U.S. forces reinforced the checkpoint. A U.S. Stryker armoured vehicle was also destroyed by a roadside bomb in Sadr City, and there were several rocket attacks in the area overnight, he said.
The clashes have threatened a ceasefire Sadr imposed on his Mehdi Army militia last August.
Sadr, an influential leader who has not been seen in public for months, issued a statement calling on Iraqis to stage sit-ins all over Iraq and said he would declare "civil revolt" if attacks by U.S. and Iraqi forces continued.
Streets in Basra were largely empty except for Iraqi security forces, and shops remained closed. At least four Iraqi helicopters could be seen hovering over the city.
"The situation is so tense. I did not go to work today. Nobody is going to work," said Kareem, a Basra resident who would only give his first name. "There are gunmen at every intersection."
An official with Iraq's Southern Oil Company said fighting had not affected Basra's oil output or exports, which provide the vast majority of government revenues.
"The work of the oil companies concerning production and exports continue as normal because the military operations are taking place far away," he said. (Writing by Randy Fabi; Editing by Dominic Evans)
-------------
14 killed, 140 wounded in Baghdad's Sadr City
DEATH TO MALIKI DEATH TO UNITED SHAITANIC STATES
I don't think so Ayatollah will be happy inside his peaceful home of Najaf
26 Mar 2008 07:56:15 GMT
Source: Reuters
(Adds Bustan quote)
BAGHDAD, March 26 (Reuters) - Fourteen people were killed and more than 140 wounded in clashes between security forces and Shi'ite militants in Baghdad's Sadr City slum, a medical source said on Wednesday.
The source in the health office for the eastern half of Baghdad said the figures came from the Sadr and Imam Ali hospitals in Sadr City and the Kindi hospital in central Baghdad.
He said the casualties included women and children caught in the crossfire in the clashes, which broke out on Tuesday and continued overnight.
Ali Bustan, general director of the health office, said at least 8 people had been killed and 70 wounded.
"We have a shortage of doctors because the American troops are not letting them into Sadr City," he told Reuters. (Reporting by Aseel Kami; writing by Peter Graff; editing by Ross Colvin)
--------------
By Sholnn Freeman and Sudarsan RaghavanWashington Post Foreign Service
Wednesday, March 26, 2008; Page A01
It was unclear why U.S. forces would take part in a broad armed challenge to Sadr and his thousands-strong militia on the eve of Petraeus's assessment, which the Bush administration has said would greatly influence its decision on whether to draw down troop levels.
But many Sadr followers view the offensive as the latest attempt by the United States and Sadr's Shiite rivals, who run Iraq's government, to take advantage of Sadr's cease-fire to weaken his movement politically ahead of provincial elections that could take place this year.
"We are really scared," said Aahad Hamid, 27, a Basra University employee whose voice quivered on the phone as Iraqi attack helicopters flew over the city. "We can hear the voice of the bullets."
In a sign of the offensive's importance, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki flew to Basra on Monday to oversee operations.
In addition to resisting with arms, Sadr's movement led a labor strike for a second day in many parts of eastern and central Baghdad on Tuesday, demanding the release of Sadr's jailed followers and an end to Iraqi government raids. Sadrist leaders ordered stores to close and taxi and bus drivers to stop operations. Many neighborhoods turned into virtual ghost towns, their usually busy streets all but empty. Parents kept their children home from school.
Sadr, who imposed the cease-fire to improve his nationalist credentials and rein in his often unruly militia, is under immense pressure from senior loyalists to lift the cease-fire order. Two weeks ago, he issued a statement permitting the Mahdi Army to fire on U.S. and Iraqi forces in self-defense. Hazim al-Araji, a senior Sadr official in the southern holy city of Najaf, told reporters there that the cease-fire remains in place despite Tuesday's clashes.
------
Later, hundreds of Sadr followers took to the streets of Najaf, carrying Korans, Iraqi flags and olive branches. Calling Maliki "the agent of Americans," they chanted: "No, no occupation! No, no terrorism!"
"The Iraqi army went to Basra under the pretext of imposing a security plan, but the fact is they are targeting Sadrists," said Haidar al-Jaberi, a Sadr official who joined the protest.
Violence has gripped Basra since December, when British troops handed over control of the province to the Iraqi government. A power struggle between the Mahdi Army and its main rival, the Badr Organization militia of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, has battered the city in recent months. Smaller Shiite militias are also taking part in the fighting.
Ahead of the offensive, the Iraqi government closed off land access to the city and imposed a nighttime curfew until further notice. The government ordered schools, institutes and universities to cancel classes from Tuesday through Thursday. Some residents said they had no time to stock up on food and clean water.
Residents also reported that sporadic clashes began in Basra early Tuesday morning in the neighborhoods of Hayania, Jubaila and Jumhuria, all known Sadr strongholds. In telephone interviews, they described seeing military vehicles, soldiers and policemen exchanging fire with gunmen. Television footage showed militiamen firing rocket-propelled grenades at Iraqi security forces; others attacked from rooftops with AK-47 assault rifles, machine guns and mortars.
"No one is on the street," said Mohammed Kadhim, who owns a clothing shop in the city center. As he spoke, gunfire could be heard in the background. "I am not able to go out of my house."
Kadhim added that one of his neighbors had been shot in the face and was in critical condition.
"It's a tough and difficult battle," he said, adding that his men were fighting Mahdi Army militias, criminal gangs and death squads.
The adviser, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to reporters, said he expected the campaign to take a week to 10 days. "No state can have two armies. It is either the Iraqi military or the Mahdi Army," he said.
Col. Bill Buckner, a U.S. military spokesman, said coalition forces were providing intelligence, surveillance and support aircraft. Maj. Tom Holloway, a British military spokesman, said British forces were standing by but were not involved in the crackdown. He also said the British and Americans were providing surveillance support from aircraft.
As the offensive progressed, violence broke out elsewhere in the country. In Baghdad's al-Amin neighborhood, Mahdi Army gunmen stormed two offices of the Dawa party, which Maliki heads, and clashed with guards there. Five Mahdi Army gunmen and two Dawa guards were killed, an Interior Ministry official said.
In Sadr City on Tuesday afternoon, Mahdi Army militiamen were manning checkpoints and directing traffic. The main police station was empty.
Abu Ali al-Fartousi, a Mahdi Army fighter, said a battle broke out in Sadr City at 10:30 p.m., with Mahdi fighters using machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades to repel government forces. A U.S. military spokesman reported no word on any late-night fighting in Sadr City.
Lt. Col. Steven Stover, a U.S. military spokesman, said U.S. troops backed Iraqi security forces as they engaged with "special groups criminal elements outside of Sadr City." A U.S. soldier was killed about 5 p.m. in an attack near Baghdad's Adhamiyah district, the U.S. military said. He was not identified.
Special correspondents Zaid Sabah, Naseer Nouri, Dalya Hassan and K.I. Ibrahim in Baghdad, Saad Sarhan in Najaf, and Washington Post staff in Nasiriyah contributed to this report.
Tuesday, March 25, 2008
Smoke , Explosions, Fire, Bullets from Basra to Baghdad every where
Iraqi forces fight Mehdi Army in Basra
By Aref Mohammed
8 minutes ago
BASRA, Iraq (Reuters) - Iraqi security forces battled the Mehdi Army militia in Basra on Tuesday in a drive to win control of the southern oil city, but violence and unrest spread to Baghdad and other cities.
Police and health workers said at least 12 people were killed in the fighting in districts of central and northern Basra where Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army has a strong presence.
In a statement read out by a senior aide on Tuesday, Sadr called on Iraqis to stage sit-ins all over Iraq and said he would declare a "civil revolt" if attacks by U.S. and Iraqi security forces continued. He also threatened a "third step," but said it was too early to announce what it would be.
Columns of black smoke rose above Basra and explosions and machinegun fire could be heard. Reuters Television pictures showed masked gunmen firing mortars in the street, while others drove around in captured Iraqi army and police vehicles.
"There are clashes in the streets. Bullets are coming from everywhere and we can hear the sound of rocket explosions. This has been going on since dawn," Basra resident Jamil told Reuters by telephone as he cowered in his home.
Four mortars and a Katyusha rocket fell on Basra Palace, the former British military base that is now the local police headquarters. It was not immediately clear if there were any casualties.
The Mehdi Army, which has thousands of fighters, has kept a relatively low profile since last August when Sadr called a ceasefire, one of the main factors behind the sharp reduction in sectarian violence in Iraq in recent months.
But the militia has chafed at the truce, saying U.S. and Iraqi forces exploited it to carry out indiscriminate arrests.
Sadr's followers launched what they called "a civil disobedience campaign" in Baghdad on Monday, forcing store-owners to close in several districts.
Pro-Sadr students forced Mustansiriya University in Baghdad to close on Tuesday. Members of Sadr's movement said the protest would spread to other towns and cities from Wednesday.
Police sources said Sadr supporters seized control of five districts in the southern town of Kut on Tuesday after clashes between gunmen and police.
Mehdi Army fighters also battled police in two neighborhoods in the centre of the southern town of Hilla. A Reuters witness reported hearing the sound of intense gunfire.
In Baghdad, U.S. and Iraqi forces sealed off the Mehdi Army stronghold of Sadr City, a sprawling slum of 2 million people, after the militia ordered police and soldiers off the streets.
Police said fighting erupted in several Sadr City neighborhoods between Mehdi Army fighters and the Badr Organization, the armed wing of a rival Shi'ite faction.
Baghdad's Green Zone, the government and diplomatic compound, was hit by several salvoes of rockets during the day. U.S. military spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Steven Stover said they had been fired from Sadr City.
Police imposed curfews in the southern cities of Kut, Hilla, Nassiriya, Samawa and Diwaniya.
MALIKI IN BASRA
In Basra two ambulance drivers said they had transported eight bodies to Basra's Sadr Education hospital. A police major at al-Mawana hospital said four bodies were received.
"This operation will not come to an end in Basra without the law prevailing and being respected," Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said.
But analysts said the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who was in Basra to oversee the operation, would struggle to overcome militias who were looking to keep hold of their share of Basra's oil wealth.
Sadrists and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), the two most powerful Shi'ite factions in Iraq, have been vying for control of Basra along with a smaller Shi'ite party, Fadhila, which controls key oil industry jobs in Basra.
Peter Harling, a Damascus-based analyst at the International Crisis Group think tank, said Sadr's followers were angry because they believed the United States had chosen to support SIIC's Badr Organization.
"The fact that Sadr called upon his followers to implement a civil disobedience campaign reflects the pressure building upon him. There is huge frustration among the group's rank and file."
Basra's oilfields hold 80 percent of Iraq's oil wealth. Iraqi oil industry sources said the fields, which exported 1.54 million barrels of oil per day in February, were operating normally on Tuesday.
The British military said no British ground forces were involved in the operation, but warplanes from the U.S.-led coalition were carrying out aerial surveillance.
(Writing by Ross Colvin, additional reporting by Waleed Ibrahim, Wisam Mohammed and Randy Fabi in Baghdad, editing by Dominic Evans)
By Aref Mohammed
8 minutes ago
BASRA, Iraq (Reuters) - Iraqi security forces battled the Mehdi Army militia in Basra on Tuesday in a drive to win control of the southern oil city, but violence and unrest spread to Baghdad and other cities.
Police and health workers said at least 12 people were killed in the fighting in districts of central and northern Basra where Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army has a strong presence.
In a statement read out by a senior aide on Tuesday, Sadr called on Iraqis to stage sit-ins all over Iraq and said he would declare a "civil revolt" if attacks by U.S. and Iraqi security forces continued. He also threatened a "third step," but said it was too early to announce what it would be.
Columns of black smoke rose above Basra and explosions and machinegun fire could be heard. Reuters Television pictures showed masked gunmen firing mortars in the street, while others drove around in captured Iraqi army and police vehicles.
"There are clashes in the streets. Bullets are coming from everywhere and we can hear the sound of rocket explosions. This has been going on since dawn," Basra resident Jamil told Reuters by telephone as he cowered in his home.
Four mortars and a Katyusha rocket fell on Basra Palace, the former British military base that is now the local police headquarters. It was not immediately clear if there were any casualties.
The Mehdi Army, which has thousands of fighters, has kept a relatively low profile since last August when Sadr called a ceasefire, one of the main factors behind the sharp reduction in sectarian violence in Iraq in recent months.
But the militia has chafed at the truce, saying U.S. and Iraqi forces exploited it to carry out indiscriminate arrests.
Sadr's followers launched what they called "a civil disobedience campaign" in Baghdad on Monday, forcing store-owners to close in several districts.
Pro-Sadr students forced Mustansiriya University in Baghdad to close on Tuesday. Members of Sadr's movement said the protest would spread to other towns and cities from Wednesday.
Police sources said Sadr supporters seized control of five districts in the southern town of Kut on Tuesday after clashes between gunmen and police.
Mehdi Army fighters also battled police in two neighborhoods in the centre of the southern town of Hilla. A Reuters witness reported hearing the sound of intense gunfire.
In Baghdad, U.S. and Iraqi forces sealed off the Mehdi Army stronghold of Sadr City, a sprawling slum of 2 million people, after the militia ordered police and soldiers off the streets.
Police said fighting erupted in several Sadr City neighborhoods between Mehdi Army fighters and the Badr Organization, the armed wing of a rival Shi'ite faction.
Baghdad's Green Zone, the government and diplomatic compound, was hit by several salvoes of rockets during the day. U.S. military spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Steven Stover said they had been fired from Sadr City.
Police imposed curfews in the southern cities of Kut, Hilla, Nassiriya, Samawa and Diwaniya.
MALIKI IN BASRA
In Basra two ambulance drivers said they had transported eight bodies to Basra's Sadr Education hospital. A police major at al-Mawana hospital said four bodies were received.
"This operation will not come to an end in Basra without the law prevailing and being respected," Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said.
But analysts said the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who was in Basra to oversee the operation, would struggle to overcome militias who were looking to keep hold of their share of Basra's oil wealth.
Sadrists and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), the two most powerful Shi'ite factions in Iraq, have been vying for control of Basra along with a smaller Shi'ite party, Fadhila, which controls key oil industry jobs in Basra.
Peter Harling, a Damascus-based analyst at the International Crisis Group think tank, said Sadr's followers were angry because they believed the United States had chosen to support SIIC's Badr Organization.
"The fact that Sadr called upon his followers to implement a civil disobedience campaign reflects the pressure building upon him. There is huge frustration among the group's rank and file."
Basra's oilfields hold 80 percent of Iraq's oil wealth. Iraqi oil industry sources said the fields, which exported 1.54 million barrels of oil per day in February, were operating normally on Tuesday.
The British military said no British ground forces were involved in the operation, but warplanes from the U.S.-led coalition were carrying out aerial surveillance.
(Writing by Ross Colvin, additional reporting by Waleed Ibrahim, Wisam Mohammed and Randy Fabi in Baghdad, editing by Dominic Evans)
Friday, March 21, 2008
165-year-old maps burnt
* BoR member rejects claims that Arbab govt records burnt
By Amar Guriro
KARACHI: The city’s records, some over a century old, were burnt in the fire at the Board of Revenue Sindh building early Thursday morning.
These records included 165-year-old historical and administrative records such as city surveys, maps, measurements, locations of all major arteries, small lanes, roads, temples, churches, mosques, graveyards, amenity plots, hospitals, government schools, public parks, railway tracks, tombs and shrines of saints, cow grazing spots, potable water ponds, government offices and all other places for which the government has allotted land.
“In the colonial era when Bombay (Mumbai) was part of Sindh, the British government directed for the first time for a city survey at the grass-roots level in 1843,” said an official who said he was not authorized to speak. “The survey was continued till 1911. During it, the revenue team measured every inch of the land of Sindh.”
This was a time when Karachi consisted of only seven dehs. Today the city has 92 dehs with 156 tapas, with a tapo being the smallest revenue unit. Tapas are combined to make a deh, dehs are combined to make a union council and union councils make a taluka (or town). A combination of talukas (or towns) makes a district.
There were also records of other cities in Sindh, said Syed Anwar Hyder, a senior member of the Board of Revenue.
An official of the city survey department said on conditions of anonymity that records of the land allocated during the tenure of former Sindh CM Dr Arbab Ghulam Rahim were also burnt. This claim was rejected by Hyder.
When asked why such valuable material was kept in such a building, he replied that the records had been safe for a century and there was no reason to move them. He also rejected arson. “It could have been a short circuit, but we have yet to investigate that,” Hyder said. “It was a public holiday and almost all the offices were closed and only a few officials came in the morning to do some important work,” he said. “The fire broke out all of a sudden in the record room located on the rooftop of the office of the superintendent of the city survey.”
--------------
Records go up in flames at Secretariat
By Faraz Khan
KARACHI: Important records of the surveys and land revenue department were destroyed Thursday after several government department offices, including the Board of Revenue building, were gutted in an inferno that erupted at the Sindh Secretariat.
The decades-old building was established in 1836, during the British government, and is located opposite the Sindh Home Department, a short distance from the Sindh High Court. A four-member investigation team has been formed on the directives of the Sindh chief minister to probe the incident.
Fire-fighting vehicles rushed to the scene and initiated the rescue operation. A number of Edhi and Chippa ambulances, along with police and rangers personnel, followed. Thirteen vehicles, including an automobile rescue unit and two snorkels, took part in the operation. The fire was finally put out by 2:19 p.m.
An official said that the building housed offices of the armed forces, social welfare, planning and development and revenue and stamps departments on its upper floor. Offices of various department wings, including a survey branch and the office of the IG of Sindh, were situated on the lower floor, he added.
Quoting Anwar Haider, a senior member of the central board of revenue, Preedy DSP Salman Hussain said that the offices were closed because of the holiday and the record room is usually closed as well. The DSP said that Haider claimed that a watchman told him at around 10:25 a.m. that smoke was coming out of the record room.
“We were informed of the situation at 10:53 a.m. via police helpline Madadgar 15,” said DSP Hussain. “Though, the fire had engulfed nearly 40 to 50 percent of the infrastructure when the fire department got there.”
To a question, he said that he could not say anything about the delay in communication because all the departments, including the police, were still engaged in rescue work.
Sindh Inspector General of Police (IGP) Azhar Ali Farooqui said that fire incidents have increased in the last eight to 10 months. “Some of them were accidental but some have been suspicious. An inquiry team has been formed and I will also work on this case,” he said.
Chief Fire Officer Ehtishamuddin said that the building the fire broke out in was completely damaged. “If we were informed on time it would’ve been possible to save the important records, and also the building. But the department informed us 30 minutes after first information.”
To a question, he said, “It is not our job to find the cause of the fire; that is for the police to do. They were complaining to us that we got there late. But, I have the records of when we received the information.”
By Amar Guriro
KARACHI: The city’s records, some over a century old, were burnt in the fire at the Board of Revenue Sindh building early Thursday morning.
These records included 165-year-old historical and administrative records such as city surveys, maps, measurements, locations of all major arteries, small lanes, roads, temples, churches, mosques, graveyards, amenity plots, hospitals, government schools, public parks, railway tracks, tombs and shrines of saints, cow grazing spots, potable water ponds, government offices and all other places for which the government has allotted land.
“In the colonial era when Bombay (Mumbai) was part of Sindh, the British government directed for the first time for a city survey at the grass-roots level in 1843,” said an official who said he was not authorized to speak. “The survey was continued till 1911. During it, the revenue team measured every inch of the land of Sindh.”
This was a time when Karachi consisted of only seven dehs. Today the city has 92 dehs with 156 tapas, with a tapo being the smallest revenue unit. Tapas are combined to make a deh, dehs are combined to make a union council and union councils make a taluka (or town). A combination of talukas (or towns) makes a district.
There were also records of other cities in Sindh, said Syed Anwar Hyder, a senior member of the Board of Revenue.
An official of the city survey department said on conditions of anonymity that records of the land allocated during the tenure of former Sindh CM Dr Arbab Ghulam Rahim were also burnt. This claim was rejected by Hyder.
When asked why such valuable material was kept in such a building, he replied that the records had been safe for a century and there was no reason to move them. He also rejected arson. “It could have been a short circuit, but we have yet to investigate that,” Hyder said. “It was a public holiday and almost all the offices were closed and only a few officials came in the morning to do some important work,” he said. “The fire broke out all of a sudden in the record room located on the rooftop of the office of the superintendent of the city survey.”
--------------
Records go up in flames at Secretariat
By Faraz Khan
KARACHI: Important records of the surveys and land revenue department were destroyed Thursday after several government department offices, including the Board of Revenue building, were gutted in an inferno that erupted at the Sindh Secretariat.
The decades-old building was established in 1836, during the British government, and is located opposite the Sindh Home Department, a short distance from the Sindh High Court. A four-member investigation team has been formed on the directives of the Sindh chief minister to probe the incident.
Fire-fighting vehicles rushed to the scene and initiated the rescue operation. A number of Edhi and Chippa ambulances, along with police and rangers personnel, followed. Thirteen vehicles, including an automobile rescue unit and two snorkels, took part in the operation. The fire was finally put out by 2:19 p.m.
An official said that the building housed offices of the armed forces, social welfare, planning and development and revenue and stamps departments on its upper floor. Offices of various department wings, including a survey branch and the office of the IG of Sindh, were situated on the lower floor, he added.
Quoting Anwar Haider, a senior member of the central board of revenue, Preedy DSP Salman Hussain said that the offices were closed because of the holiday and the record room is usually closed as well. The DSP said that Haider claimed that a watchman told him at around 10:25 a.m. that smoke was coming out of the record room.
“We were informed of the situation at 10:53 a.m. via police helpline Madadgar 15,” said DSP Hussain. “Though, the fire had engulfed nearly 40 to 50 percent of the infrastructure when the fire department got there.”
To a question, he said that he could not say anything about the delay in communication because all the departments, including the police, were still engaged in rescue work.
Sindh Inspector General of Police (IGP) Azhar Ali Farooqui said that fire incidents have increased in the last eight to 10 months. “Some of them were accidental but some have been suspicious. An inquiry team has been formed and I will also work on this case,” he said.
Chief Fire Officer Ehtishamuddin said that the building the fire broke out in was completely damaged. “If we were informed on time it would’ve been possible to save the important records, and also the building. But the department informed us 30 minutes after first information.”
To a question, he said, “It is not our job to find the cause of the fire; that is for the police to do. They were complaining to us that we got there late. But, I have the records of when we received the information.”
Thursday, March 20, 2008
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Wednesday, March 19, 2008
Tuesday, March 18, 2008
Daughter of Iran Revolution Struggles Against the Veil
By ELAINE SCIOLINO
TEHRAN — When it comes to credentials in Iran's Islamic Republic, Zahra
Eshraghi's are cast in gold.
Her grandfather was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the cleric who
overthrew a king and led a revolution in the name of Islam. Her
husband's brother is the reformist president, Mohammad Khatami. And her
husband, Mohammad Reza Khatami, is the head of the reformist wing of
Parliament. -
In a society where women can derive enormous power from the men in their
lives, those three pillars give Ms. Eshraghi enormous standing. Yet the
39-year-old government official and mother of two has a confession to
make. She feels trapped by her family history. And she hates wearing the
black veil known as the chador.
"I'm sorry to say that the chador was forced on women," she said over
tea and cakes in her upscale apartment decorated in ornate furniture in
northern Tehran. "Forced — in government buildings, in the school my
daughter attends. This garment that was traditional Iranian dress was
turned into a symbol of revolution. People have lost their respect for
it. I only wear it because of my family status."
Those are the words of a rebel. Ayatollah Khomeini called the chador the
"the flag of the revolution," and early in the revolution of 1979
encouraged all women to wear it. Eventually, all women were forced to
wear garments that cover their heads and hide the shape of their bodies.
Ms. Eshraghi's frankness is emblematic of the changes today in Iran,
where the values and promises of the revolution have given way to an
intense, even dangerous debate about whether religion has a place in
politics and society.
As a member of the ayatollah's family, Ms. Eshraghi is expected to
embrace the trappings of the revolution and the Islamic Republic that
followed. Nothing symbolizes the revolution more than the ankle-length
black chador that covers all but a woman's face.
But the attitude toward the chador in Iran today has become so negative
that some merchants — particularly in northern Tehran, which is more
secular, Westernized and wealthy than the rest of the city — refuse to
serve "chadori," as chador-wearing women are called. Chadori who do not
want to expose themselves to insults avoid the new food court in Tehran
that serves tacos and pizza but no traditional Persian food.
"I was in a shop, and I wanted to buy a pair of pants, and the owner
wouldn't sell them to me because I was in a chador," Ms. Eshraghi said.
"We have only ourselves to blame. People are not happy with the
establishment, and the chador has become its symbol."
Pale-eyed, with perfectly manicured eyebrows and slightly frosted hair,
Ms. Eshraghi said she had always covered her hair in public — at least
with a scarf — because of the dictates of Islam. She fought colleagues
at the Interior Ministry, where she promotes women's issues, when they
tried to force her to wear more modest dress and dark colors underneath
her chador. Behind closed doors, she wears fitted pantsuits that do not
conceal her full figure.
"I told them it was not anybody's business what I wear under the
chador," she said.
Asked if she would ever want to throw off the head scarf in public, she
asked, "Do you want to issue me my death sentence?"
Just as remarkable is Ms. Eshraghi's willingness to share her feelings
with someone outside the family. Iran is a society with high walls
between public and private life, walls that are even more impenetrable
among the clerical class. "I am sitting here, and I feel I cannot be
myself," she said. "It's not the true me. I have to wear a mask."
Her husband, by contrast, a medical doctor by training and one of the
most visible politicians in the country, declined to be interviewed.
She recalled a favorite song, a pre-revolutionary ballad (banned after
the revolution) in which a singer laments the fact that people have to
hide behind masks. "I used to play that song over and over because it
seemed like my life story," she said.
No matter that her grandfather condemned music shortly after the
revolution as "no different from opium" because it "stupefies persons
listening to it and makes their brains inactive and frivolous."
"I still sometimes sing at home and dance," Ms. Eshraghi said. "I can't
kill those feelings."
Most of Ms. Eshraghi's life has revolved around the Islamic revolution.
When Ayatollah Khomeini settled in a suburb of Paris before returning
victorious to Iran to make his revolution, she was brought along at age
14. Four years later, she married a medical student four years her
senior whose father was a famous ayatollah who was well acquainted with
her family.
Her family did not allow her to study her favorite subjects, music and
painting, in college. So she turned to philosophy instead. Even then, it
did not please the ayatollah, who told her philosophy was a subject that
had to be studied all one's life and was therefore too difficult for
her. "There was always a lot of pressure on me," she said. "I lost a lot
of my youth."
When Mr. Khatami, then a relatively unknown mid-level cleric who ran the
national library, first ran for president in 1997 on a platform of
reform, she opened a campaign headquarters for him.
Now she has abandoned hope that the political reformers will defeat
conservative clerics who want to keep a rigid political system in the
name of Islam. In a blunt criticism of her brother-in-law, she said, "I
feel President Khatami's speed has been like that of a turtle."
She longs for a more peaceful life, without politics. "I used to think
we could change the situation, but now I have come to the conclusion
that only one set of beliefs can rule," she said. "I feel haunted that
our phones are tapped, our rooms are tapped. I have spent my life in
political wars. Now I count the days when my husband leaves politics."
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/02/international/middleeast/02IRAN.htm...
TEHRAN — When it comes to credentials in Iran's Islamic Republic, Zahra
Eshraghi's are cast in gold.
Her grandfather was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the cleric who
overthrew a king and led a revolution in the name of Islam. Her
husband's brother is the reformist president, Mohammad Khatami. And her
husband, Mohammad Reza Khatami, is the head of the reformist wing of
Parliament. -
In a society where women can derive enormous power from the men in their
lives, those three pillars give Ms. Eshraghi enormous standing. Yet the
39-year-old government official and mother of two has a confession to
make. She feels trapped by her family history. And she hates wearing the
black veil known as the chador.
"I'm sorry to say that the chador was forced on women," she said over
tea and cakes in her upscale apartment decorated in ornate furniture in
northern Tehran. "Forced — in government buildings, in the school my
daughter attends. This garment that was traditional Iranian dress was
turned into a symbol of revolution. People have lost their respect for
it. I only wear it because of my family status."
Those are the words of a rebel. Ayatollah Khomeini called the chador the
"the flag of the revolution," and early in the revolution of 1979
encouraged all women to wear it. Eventually, all women were forced to
wear garments that cover their heads and hide the shape of their bodies.
Ms. Eshraghi's frankness is emblematic of the changes today in Iran,
where the values and promises of the revolution have given way to an
intense, even dangerous debate about whether religion has a place in
politics and society.
As a member of the ayatollah's family, Ms. Eshraghi is expected to
embrace the trappings of the revolution and the Islamic Republic that
followed. Nothing symbolizes the revolution more than the ankle-length
black chador that covers all but a woman's face.
But the attitude toward the chador in Iran today has become so negative
that some merchants — particularly in northern Tehran, which is more
secular, Westernized and wealthy than the rest of the city — refuse to
serve "chadori," as chador-wearing women are called. Chadori who do not
want to expose themselves to insults avoid the new food court in Tehran
that serves tacos and pizza but no traditional Persian food.
"I was in a shop, and I wanted to buy a pair of pants, and the owner
wouldn't sell them to me because I was in a chador," Ms. Eshraghi said.
"We have only ourselves to blame. People are not happy with the
establishment, and the chador has become its symbol."
Pale-eyed, with perfectly manicured eyebrows and slightly frosted hair,
Ms. Eshraghi said she had always covered her hair in public — at least
with a scarf — because of the dictates of Islam. She fought colleagues
at the Interior Ministry, where she promotes women's issues, when they
tried to force her to wear more modest dress and dark colors underneath
her chador. Behind closed doors, she wears fitted pantsuits that do not
conceal her full figure.
"I told them it was not anybody's business what I wear under the
chador," she said.
Asked if she would ever want to throw off the head scarf in public, she
asked, "Do you want to issue me my death sentence?"
Just as remarkable is Ms. Eshraghi's willingness to share her feelings
with someone outside the family. Iran is a society with high walls
between public and private life, walls that are even more impenetrable
among the clerical class. "I am sitting here, and I feel I cannot be
myself," she said. "It's not the true me. I have to wear a mask."
Her husband, by contrast, a medical doctor by training and one of the
most visible politicians in the country, declined to be interviewed.
She recalled a favorite song, a pre-revolutionary ballad (banned after
the revolution) in which a singer laments the fact that people have to
hide behind masks. "I used to play that song over and over because it
seemed like my life story," she said.
No matter that her grandfather condemned music shortly after the
revolution as "no different from opium" because it "stupefies persons
listening to it and makes their brains inactive and frivolous."
"I still sometimes sing at home and dance," Ms. Eshraghi said. "I can't
kill those feelings."
Most of Ms. Eshraghi's life has revolved around the Islamic revolution.
When Ayatollah Khomeini settled in a suburb of Paris before returning
victorious to Iran to make his revolution, she was brought along at age
14. Four years later, she married a medical student four years her
senior whose father was a famous ayatollah who was well acquainted with
her family.
Her family did not allow her to study her favorite subjects, music and
painting, in college. So she turned to philosophy instead. Even then, it
did not please the ayatollah, who told her philosophy was a subject that
had to be studied all one's life and was therefore too difficult for
her. "There was always a lot of pressure on me," she said. "I lost a lot
of my youth."
When Mr. Khatami, then a relatively unknown mid-level cleric who ran the
national library, first ran for president in 1997 on a platform of
reform, she opened a campaign headquarters for him.
Now she has abandoned hope that the political reformers will defeat
conservative clerics who want to keep a rigid political system in the
name of Islam. In a blunt criticism of her brother-in-law, she said, "I
feel President Khatami's speed has been like that of a turtle."
She longs for a more peaceful life, without politics. "I used to think
we could change the situation, but now I have come to the conclusion
that only one set of beliefs can rule," she said. "I feel haunted that
our phones are tapped, our rooms are tapped. I have spent my life in
political wars. Now I count the days when my husband leaves politics."
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/02/international/middleeast/02IRAN.htm...
Bomb Kills Dozens In Iraqi City, Kerbala, Near Imam Hussein (as) Shrine - 75 injured,45 dead
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Official: Karbala Blast was IED, Not Suicide
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